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Contracts, pay and performance in the sport of kings: Evidence from horse racing

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Contracts, pay and performance in the sport of kings: Evidence from horse racing. / Butler, D.; Butler, R.; Simmons, R.
In: British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 60, No. 1, 31.03.2022, p. 152-175.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Butler, D, Butler, R & Simmons, R 2022, 'Contracts, pay and performance in the sport of kings: Evidence from horse racing', British Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 60, no. 1, pp. 152-175. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjir.12600

APA

Butler, D., Butler, R., & Simmons, R. (2022). Contracts, pay and performance in the sport of kings: Evidence from horse racing. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 60(1), 152-175. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjir.12600

Vancouver

Butler D, Butler R, Simmons R. Contracts, pay and performance in the sport of kings: Evidence from horse racing. British Journal of Industrial Relations. 2022 Mar 31;60(1):152-175. Epub 2021 Apr 6. doi: 10.1111/bjir.12600

Author

Butler, D. ; Butler, R. ; Simmons, R. / Contracts, pay and performance in the sport of kings : Evidence from horse racing. In: British Journal of Industrial Relations. 2022 ; Vol. 60, No. 1. pp. 152-175.

Bibtex

@article{00ced92c6ea640fdaf6337913b64455f,
title = "Contracts, pay and performance in the sport of kings: Evidence from horse racing",
abstract = "A considerable body of evidence shows that performance-related pay schemes can raise worker productivity with much of this increase due to worker sorting. However, variations in the power of performance-related pay contracts are rarely observed. The thoroughbred horse racing industry offers such an opportunity. Contrary to earlier research, we find no evidence of worker shirking when the power of incentive contracts is reduced through jockeys switching from complete performance-related pay schemes into a salaried (retainer) contract. Moreover, salary contracts result in legacy effects with superior performance continuing for elite jockeys even after their salary agreements have expired. We argue this is due to a reduction in monitoring costs. {\textcopyright} 2021 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.",
author = "D. Butler and R. Butler and R. Simmons",
year = "2022",
month = mar,
day = "31",
doi = "10.1111/bjir.12600",
language = "English",
volume = "60",
pages = "152--175",
journal = "British Journal of Industrial Relations",
issn = "0007-1080",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Contracts, pay and performance in the sport of kings

T2 - Evidence from horse racing

AU - Butler, D.

AU - Butler, R.

AU - Simmons, R.

PY - 2022/3/31

Y1 - 2022/3/31

N2 - A considerable body of evidence shows that performance-related pay schemes can raise worker productivity with much of this increase due to worker sorting. However, variations in the power of performance-related pay contracts are rarely observed. The thoroughbred horse racing industry offers such an opportunity. Contrary to earlier research, we find no evidence of worker shirking when the power of incentive contracts is reduced through jockeys switching from complete performance-related pay schemes into a salaried (retainer) contract. Moreover, salary contracts result in legacy effects with superior performance continuing for elite jockeys even after their salary agreements have expired. We argue this is due to a reduction in monitoring costs. © 2021 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

AB - A considerable body of evidence shows that performance-related pay schemes can raise worker productivity with much of this increase due to worker sorting. However, variations in the power of performance-related pay contracts are rarely observed. The thoroughbred horse racing industry offers such an opportunity. Contrary to earlier research, we find no evidence of worker shirking when the power of incentive contracts is reduced through jockeys switching from complete performance-related pay schemes into a salaried (retainer) contract. Moreover, salary contracts result in legacy effects with superior performance continuing for elite jockeys even after their salary agreements have expired. We argue this is due to a reduction in monitoring costs. © 2021 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

U2 - 10.1111/bjir.12600

DO - 10.1111/bjir.12600

M3 - Journal article

VL - 60

SP - 152

EP - 175

JO - British Journal of Industrial Relations

JF - British Journal of Industrial Relations

SN - 0007-1080

IS - 1

ER -