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Cooperative merger and joint maximization under sequential entry

Research output: Working paper

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Cooperative merger and joint maximization under sequential entry. / Heywood, J S; Monaco, K; Rothschild, R.
Lancaster University: The Department of Economics, 2003. (Economics Working Paper Series).

Research output: Working paper

Harvard

Heywood, JS, Monaco, K & Rothschild, R 2003 'Cooperative merger and joint maximization under sequential entry' Economics Working Paper Series, The Department of Economics, Lancaster University.

APA

Heywood, J. S., Monaco, K., & Rothschild, R. (2003). Cooperative merger and joint maximization under sequential entry. (Economics Working Paper Series). The Department of Economics.

Vancouver

Heywood JS, Monaco K, Rothschild R. Cooperative merger and joint maximization under sequential entry. Lancaster University: The Department of Economics. 2003. (Economics Working Paper Series).

Author

Heywood, J S ; Monaco, K ; Rothschild, R. / Cooperative merger and joint maximization under sequential entry. Lancaster University : The Department of Economics, 2003. (Economics Working Paper Series).

Bibtex

@techreport{4ac10f1480b34bbeb5809b7ba533bdfb,
title = "Cooperative merger and joint maximization under sequential entry",
abstract = "This paper explores the concept of cooperative merger between two of three entrants that arrive sequentially in a spatial market and practise discriminatory pricing. In this framework, in contrast to much of the theoretical literature, the so-called 'merger paradox' can be comprehensively overturned. We compare our results with those arising when one firm stategically locates two plants. Although this second problem is superficially similar to the first, the underlying behaviour and implications differ in crucial respects. The welfare consequences of all our results are demonstrated.",
keywords = "Spatial price discrimination, sequential entry, cooperative merger, merger paradox, multi-plant location",
author = "Heywood, {J S} and K Monaco and R Rothschild",
year = "2003",
language = "English",
series = "Economics Working Paper Series",
publisher = "The Department of Economics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "The Department of Economics",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Cooperative merger and joint maximization under sequential entry

AU - Heywood, J S

AU - Monaco, K

AU - Rothschild, R

PY - 2003

Y1 - 2003

N2 - This paper explores the concept of cooperative merger between two of three entrants that arrive sequentially in a spatial market and practise discriminatory pricing. In this framework, in contrast to much of the theoretical literature, the so-called 'merger paradox' can be comprehensively overturned. We compare our results with those arising when one firm stategically locates two plants. Although this second problem is superficially similar to the first, the underlying behaviour and implications differ in crucial respects. The welfare consequences of all our results are demonstrated.

AB - This paper explores the concept of cooperative merger between two of three entrants that arrive sequentially in a spatial market and practise discriminatory pricing. In this framework, in contrast to much of the theoretical literature, the so-called 'merger paradox' can be comprehensively overturned. We compare our results with those arising when one firm stategically locates two plants. Although this second problem is superficially similar to the first, the underlying behaviour and implications differ in crucial respects. The welfare consequences of all our results are demonstrated.

KW - Spatial price discrimination

KW - sequential entry

KW - cooperative merger

KW - merger paradox

KW - multi-plant location

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Economics Working Paper Series

BT - Cooperative merger and joint maximization under sequential entry

PB - The Department of Economics

CY - Lancaster University

ER -