Rights statement: This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 194, 105-123, 2021 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.12.010
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Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Coordination with preferences over the coalition size. / Louis, Philippos; Troumpounis, Orestis; Tsakas, Nikolaos et al.
In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 194, 28.02.2022, p. 105-123.Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Coordination with preferences over the coalition size
AU - Louis, Philippos
AU - Troumpounis, Orestis
AU - Tsakas, Nikolaos
AU - Xefteris, Dimitrios
N1 - This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 194, 105-123, 2021 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.12.010
PY - 2022/2/28
Y1 - 2022/2/28
N2 - We study a coordination game where N players simultaneously and independently decide whether to take a certain action or not. Players’ payoffs depend only on how many players take each action (i.e., the coalition size) and there is incomplete information on players’ types: “Dominant” types have a dominant strategy and care about “enough” people taking an action. “Non-dominant” types do not have a dominant strategy due to non-monotone preferences over the coalition size: their payoffs are maximized when “enough” but “not too many” people take an action. We focus on the behavior of “non-dominant” types and show how the frequency of taking each action and (mis)coordination outcomes depend on the distribution of types and types’ preference heterogeneity. Our experimental results are (mostly) in line with our theoretical predictions: The frequency of coordination failure is not only increasing in the preference heterogeneity —as predicted by the theory, but is also increasing in the share of “non-dominant” types.
AB - We study a coordination game where N players simultaneously and independently decide whether to take a certain action or not. Players’ payoffs depend only on how many players take each action (i.e., the coalition size) and there is incomplete information on players’ types: “Dominant” types have a dominant strategy and care about “enough” people taking an action. “Non-dominant” types do not have a dominant strategy due to non-monotone preferences over the coalition size: their payoffs are maximized when “enough” but “not too many” people take an action. We focus on the behavior of “non-dominant” types and show how the frequency of taking each action and (mis)coordination outcomes depend on the distribution of types and types’ preference heterogeneity. Our experimental results are (mostly) in line with our theoretical predictions: The frequency of coordination failure is not only increasing in the preference heterogeneity —as predicted by the theory, but is also increasing in the share of “non-dominant” types.
KW - Coordination
KW - Anti-coordination
KW - Laboratory experiment
KW - Protest voting
U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.12.010
DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.12.010
M3 - Journal article
VL - 194
SP - 105
EP - 123
JO - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
SN - 0167-2681
ER -