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    Rights statement: This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 194, 105-123, 2021 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.12.010

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Coordination with preferences over the coalition size

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Coordination with preferences over the coalition size. / Louis, Philippos; Troumpounis, Orestis; Tsakas, Nikolaos et al.
In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 194, 28.02.2022, p. 105-123.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Louis, P, Troumpounis, O, Tsakas, N & Xefteris, D 2022, 'Coordination with preferences over the coalition size', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 194, pp. 105-123. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.12.010

APA

Louis, P., Troumpounis, O., Tsakas, N., & Xefteris, D. (2022). Coordination with preferences over the coalition size. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 194, 105-123. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.12.010

Vancouver

Louis P, Troumpounis O, Tsakas N, Xefteris D. Coordination with preferences over the coalition size. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2022 Feb 28;194:105-123. Epub 2021 Dec 27. doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.12.010

Author

Louis, Philippos ; Troumpounis, Orestis ; Tsakas, Nikolaos et al. / Coordination with preferences over the coalition size. In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2022 ; Vol. 194. pp. 105-123.

Bibtex

@article{ddd7b6cd811c4f2f8a72e58108027cec,
title = "Coordination with preferences over the coalition size",
abstract = "We study a coordination game where N players simultaneously and independently decide whether to take a certain action or not. Players{\textquoteright} payoffs depend only on how many players take each action (i.e., the coalition size) and there is incomplete information on players{\textquoteright} types: “Dominant” types have a dominant strategy and care about “enough” people taking an action. “Non-dominant” types do not have a dominant strategy due to non-monotone preferences over the coalition size: their payoffs are maximized when “enough” but “not too many” people take an action. We focus on the behavior of “non-dominant” types and show how the frequency of taking each action and (mis)coordination outcomes depend on the distribution of types and types{\textquoteright} preference heterogeneity. Our experimental results are (mostly) in line with our theoretical predictions: The frequency of coordination failure is not only increasing in the preference heterogeneity —as predicted by the theory, but is also increasing in the share of “non-dominant” types.",
keywords = "Coordination, Anti-coordination, Laboratory experiment, Protest voting",
author = "Philippos Louis and Orestis Troumpounis and Nikolaos Tsakas and Dimitrios Xefteris",
note = "This is the author{\textquoteright}s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 194, 105-123, 2021 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.12.010",
year = "2022",
month = feb,
day = "28",
doi = "10.1016/j.jebo.2021.12.010",
language = "English",
volume = "194",
pages = "105--123",
journal = "Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization",
issn = "0167-2681",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Coordination with preferences over the coalition size

AU - Louis, Philippos

AU - Troumpounis, Orestis

AU - Tsakas, Nikolaos

AU - Xefteris, Dimitrios

N1 - This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 194, 105-123, 2021 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.12.010

PY - 2022/2/28

Y1 - 2022/2/28

N2 - We study a coordination game where N players simultaneously and independently decide whether to take a certain action or not. Players’ payoffs depend only on how many players take each action (i.e., the coalition size) and there is incomplete information on players’ types: “Dominant” types have a dominant strategy and care about “enough” people taking an action. “Non-dominant” types do not have a dominant strategy due to non-monotone preferences over the coalition size: their payoffs are maximized when “enough” but “not too many” people take an action. We focus on the behavior of “non-dominant” types and show how the frequency of taking each action and (mis)coordination outcomes depend on the distribution of types and types’ preference heterogeneity. Our experimental results are (mostly) in line with our theoretical predictions: The frequency of coordination failure is not only increasing in the preference heterogeneity —as predicted by the theory, but is also increasing in the share of “non-dominant” types.

AB - We study a coordination game where N players simultaneously and independently decide whether to take a certain action or not. Players’ payoffs depend only on how many players take each action (i.e., the coalition size) and there is incomplete information on players’ types: “Dominant” types have a dominant strategy and care about “enough” people taking an action. “Non-dominant” types do not have a dominant strategy due to non-monotone preferences over the coalition size: their payoffs are maximized when “enough” but “not too many” people take an action. We focus on the behavior of “non-dominant” types and show how the frequency of taking each action and (mis)coordination outcomes depend on the distribution of types and types’ preference heterogeneity. Our experimental results are (mostly) in line with our theoretical predictions: The frequency of coordination failure is not only increasing in the preference heterogeneity —as predicted by the theory, but is also increasing in the share of “non-dominant” types.

KW - Coordination

KW - Anti-coordination

KW - Laboratory experiment

KW - Protest voting

U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.12.010

DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.12.010

M3 - Journal article

VL - 194

SP - 105

EP - 123

JO - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

SN - 0167-2681

ER -