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Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Published
<mark>Journal publication date</mark>11/1994
<mark>Journal</mark>Journal of Mathematical Economics
Issue number6
Volume23
Number of pages16
Pages (from-to)533-548
Publication StatusPublished
<mark>Original language</mark>English

Abstract

In this paper we analyze a simple non-cooperative bargaining model for coalition formation and payoff distribution for games in coalitional form. We show that under our bargaining regime a cooperative game is core-implementable if and only if it possesses the property of increasing returns to scale for cooperation, i.e. the game is convex. This offers a characterization of a purely cooperative notion by means of a non-cooperative foundation. © 1994.