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Corporate Tournaments and Executive Compensation: Evidence from the UK

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Corporate Tournaments and Executive Compensation: Evidence from the UK. / Conyon, Martin; Peck, S; Sadler, G.
In: Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 22, No. 8, 08.2001, p. 805-815.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Conyon, M, Peck, S & Sadler, G 2001, 'Corporate Tournaments and Executive Compensation: Evidence from the UK', Strategic Management Journal, vol. 22, no. 8, pp. 805-815. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.169

APA

Conyon, M., Peck, S., & Sadler, G. (2001). Corporate Tournaments and Executive Compensation: Evidence from the UK. Strategic Management Journal, 22(8), 805-815. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.169

Vancouver

Conyon M, Peck S, Sadler G. Corporate Tournaments and Executive Compensation: Evidence from the UK. Strategic Management Journal. 2001 Aug;22(8):805-815. doi: 10.1002/smj.169

Author

Conyon, Martin ; Peck, S ; Sadler, G. / Corporate Tournaments and Executive Compensation: Evidence from the UK. In: Strategic Management Journal. 2001 ; Vol. 22, No. 8. pp. 805-815.

Bibtex

@article{162b0b0ea7fc42e58cbeb8a0489003cd,
title = "Corporate Tournaments and Executive Compensation: Evidence from the UK",
abstract = "This study tests the implications of tournament theory using data on 100 U.K. stock market companies, covering over 500 individual executives, in the late 1990s. Our results provide some evidence consistent with the operation of tournament mechanisms within the U.K. business context. Firstly, we find a convex relationship between executive pay and organizational level and secondly, that the gap between CEO pay and other board executives (i.e., tournament prize) is positively related to the number of participants in the tournament. However, we also show that the variation in executive team pay has little role in determining company performance.",
keywords = "executive compensation, tournament theory",
author = "Martin Conyon and S Peck and G Sadler",
year = "2001",
month = aug,
doi = "10.1002/smj.169",
language = "English",
volume = "22",
pages = "805--815",
journal = "Strategic Management Journal",
issn = "0143-2095",
publisher = "John Wiley and Sons Ltd",
number = "8",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Corporate Tournaments and Executive Compensation: Evidence from the UK

AU - Conyon, Martin

AU - Peck, S

AU - Sadler, G

PY - 2001/8

Y1 - 2001/8

N2 - This study tests the implications of tournament theory using data on 100 U.K. stock market companies, covering over 500 individual executives, in the late 1990s. Our results provide some evidence consistent with the operation of tournament mechanisms within the U.K. business context. Firstly, we find a convex relationship between executive pay and organizational level and secondly, that the gap between CEO pay and other board executives (i.e., tournament prize) is positively related to the number of participants in the tournament. However, we also show that the variation in executive team pay has little role in determining company performance.

AB - This study tests the implications of tournament theory using data on 100 U.K. stock market companies, covering over 500 individual executives, in the late 1990s. Our results provide some evidence consistent with the operation of tournament mechanisms within the U.K. business context. Firstly, we find a convex relationship between executive pay and organizational level and secondly, that the gap between CEO pay and other board executives (i.e., tournament prize) is positively related to the number of participants in the tournament. However, we also show that the variation in executive team pay has little role in determining company performance.

KW - executive compensation

KW - tournament theory

U2 - 10.1002/smj.169

DO - 10.1002/smj.169

M3 - Journal article

VL - 22

SP - 805

EP - 815

JO - Strategic Management Journal

JF - Strategic Management Journal

SN - 0143-2095

IS - 8

ER -