Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > Declining valuations in sequential auctions

Research

Links

Text available via DOI:

Keywords

View graph of relations

Declining valuations in sequential auctions

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Published

Standard

Declining valuations in sequential auctions. / Kittsteiner, T.; Nikutta, J.; Winter, E.
In: International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 33, No. 1, 12.2004, p. 89-106.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Kittsteiner, T, Nikutta, J & Winter, E 2004, 'Declining valuations in sequential auctions', International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 89-106. https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400186

APA

Kittsteiner, T., Nikutta, J., & Winter, E. (2004). Declining valuations in sequential auctions. International Journal of Game Theory, 33(1), 89-106. https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400186

Vancouver

Kittsteiner T, Nikutta J, Winter E. Declining valuations in sequential auctions. International Journal of Game Theory. 2004 Dec;33(1):89-106. doi: 10.1007/s001820400186

Author

Kittsteiner, T. ; Nikutta, J. ; Winter, E. / Declining valuations in sequential auctions. In: International Journal of Game Theory. 2004 ; Vol. 33, No. 1. pp. 89-106.

Bibtex

@article{53aa59378d5c41aab99289161bc9d0b2,
title = "Declining valuations in sequential auctions",
abstract = "We analyze an independent private values model where a number of objects are sold in sequential first- and second-price auctions. Bidders have unit demand and their valuation for an object is decreasing in the rank number of the auction in which it is sold. We derive efficient equilibria if prices are announced after each auction or if no information is given to bidders. We show that the sequence of prices constitutes a supermartingale. Even if we correct for the decrease in valuations for objects sold in later auctions we find that average prices are declining.",
keywords = "Declining valuations, Martin-gale property, Price decline, Sequential auctions",
author = "T. Kittsteiner and J. Nikutta and E. Winter",
year = "2004",
month = dec,
doi = "10.1007/s001820400186",
language = "English",
volume = "33",
pages = "89--106",
journal = "International Journal of Game Theory",
issn = "0020-7276",
publisher = "Springer-Verlag,",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Declining valuations in sequential auctions

AU - Kittsteiner, T.

AU - Nikutta, J.

AU - Winter, E.

PY - 2004/12

Y1 - 2004/12

N2 - We analyze an independent private values model where a number of objects are sold in sequential first- and second-price auctions. Bidders have unit demand and their valuation for an object is decreasing in the rank number of the auction in which it is sold. We derive efficient equilibria if prices are announced after each auction or if no information is given to bidders. We show that the sequence of prices constitutes a supermartingale. Even if we correct for the decrease in valuations for objects sold in later auctions we find that average prices are declining.

AB - We analyze an independent private values model where a number of objects are sold in sequential first- and second-price auctions. Bidders have unit demand and their valuation for an object is decreasing in the rank number of the auction in which it is sold. We derive efficient equilibria if prices are announced after each auction or if no information is given to bidders. We show that the sequence of prices constitutes a supermartingale. Even if we correct for the decrease in valuations for objects sold in later auctions we find that average prices are declining.

KW - Declining valuations

KW - Martin-gale property

KW - Price decline

KW - Sequential auctions

U2 - 10.1007/s001820400186

DO - 10.1007/s001820400186

M3 - Journal article

VL - 33

SP - 89

EP - 106

JO - International Journal of Game Theory

JF - International Journal of Game Theory

SN - 0020-7276

IS - 1

ER -