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Decreasing Differences in Expert Advice: Evidence from Chess Players

Research output: Working paper

Published

Standard

Decreasing Differences in Expert Advice: Evidence from Chess Players. / Bouacida, Elias; Foucart, Renaud; Jalloul, Maya.
Lancaster: Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 2024. (Economics Working Papers Series).

Research output: Working paper

Harvard

Bouacida, E, Foucart, R & Jalloul, M 2024 'Decreasing Differences in Expert Advice: Evidence from Chess Players' Economics Working Papers Series, Lancaster University, Department of Economics, Lancaster.

APA

Bouacida, E., Foucart, R., & Jalloul, M. (2024). Decreasing Differences in Expert Advice: Evidence from Chess Players. (Economics Working Papers Series). Lancaster University, Department of Economics.

Vancouver

Bouacida E, Foucart R, Jalloul M. Decreasing Differences in Expert Advice: Evidence from Chess Players. Lancaster: Lancaster University, Department of Economics. 2024 Feb 12. (Economics Working Papers Series).

Author

Bouacida, Elias ; Foucart, Renaud ; Jalloul, Maya. / Decreasing Differences in Expert Advice : Evidence from Chess Players. Lancaster : Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 2024. (Economics Working Papers Series).

Bibtex

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title = "Decreasing Differences in Expert Advice: Evidence from Chess Players",
abstract = "We study the impact of external advice on the relative performance of chessplayers. We asked players in chess tournaments to evaluate positions in past games and allowed them to revise their evaluation following advice from a high or a low ability player. While our data confirms the theoretical prediction that high-quality advice has the potential to act as a “great equalizer,” reducing the difference between high and low ability players, this is not what happens in practice. This is in part because our subjects ignore too much of the advice they receive, but also because low ability players pay – either due to overconfidence or intrinsic preference – a higher premium than high ability ones by following their initial idea instead of high-quality advice.",
keywords = "decreasing differences, expert, advice, chess, control",
author = "Elias Bouacida and Renaud Foucart and Maya Jalloul",
year = "2024",
month = feb,
day = "12",
language = "English",
series = "Economics Working Papers Series",
publisher = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Decreasing Differences in Expert Advice

T2 - Evidence from Chess Players

AU - Bouacida, Elias

AU - Foucart, Renaud

AU - Jalloul, Maya

PY - 2024/2/12

Y1 - 2024/2/12

N2 - We study the impact of external advice on the relative performance of chessplayers. We asked players in chess tournaments to evaluate positions in past games and allowed them to revise their evaluation following advice from a high or a low ability player. While our data confirms the theoretical prediction that high-quality advice has the potential to act as a “great equalizer,” reducing the difference between high and low ability players, this is not what happens in practice. This is in part because our subjects ignore too much of the advice they receive, but also because low ability players pay – either due to overconfidence or intrinsic preference – a higher premium than high ability ones by following their initial idea instead of high-quality advice.

AB - We study the impact of external advice on the relative performance of chessplayers. We asked players in chess tournaments to evaluate positions in past games and allowed them to revise their evaluation following advice from a high or a low ability player. While our data confirms the theoretical prediction that high-quality advice has the potential to act as a “great equalizer,” reducing the difference between high and low ability players, this is not what happens in practice. This is in part because our subjects ignore too much of the advice they receive, but also because low ability players pay – either due to overconfidence or intrinsic preference – a higher premium than high ability ones by following their initial idea instead of high-quality advice.

KW - decreasing differences

KW - expert

KW - advice

KW - chess

KW - control

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Economics Working Papers Series

BT - Decreasing Differences in Expert Advice

PB - Lancaster University, Department of Economics

CY - Lancaster

ER -