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Delegation in a mixed oligopoly: the case of multiple private firms

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Delegation in a mixed oligopoly: the case of multiple private firms. / Heywood, John; Ye, Guangliang.
In: Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 30, No. 2, 03.2009, p. 71-82.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Heywood, J & Ye, G 2009, 'Delegation in a mixed oligopoly: the case of multiple private firms', Managerial and Decision Economics, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 71-82. https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.1436

APA

Heywood, J., & Ye, G. (2009). Delegation in a mixed oligopoly: the case of multiple private firms. Managerial and Decision Economics, 30(2), 71-82. https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.1436

Vancouver

Heywood J, Ye G. Delegation in a mixed oligopoly: the case of multiple private firms. Managerial and Decision Economics. 2009 Mar;30(2):71-82. doi: 10.1002/mde.1436

Author

Heywood, John ; Ye, Guangliang. / Delegation in a mixed oligopoly : the case of multiple private firms. In: Managerial and Decision Economics. 2009 ; Vol. 30, No. 2. pp. 71-82.

Bibtex

@article{63a61a30442b4269bd5d314a1a695c18,
title = "Delegation in a mixed oligopoly: the case of multiple private firms",
abstract = "Previous research examining mixed duopolies shows that the use of an optimal incentive contract for the public firm increases welfare and that privatization reduces welfare. We demonstrate that these results do not generalize to a mixed oligopoly with multiple private firms. We derive the optimal incentive contract for a public firm that weighs both profit and welfare and show that its use may either increase or decrease welfare depending on the number of private firms and the exact nature of costs. We also identify the conditions that determine whether or not privatizing the public firm facing an optimal incentive contract reduces welfare.",
author = "John Heywood and Guangliang Ye",
year = "2009",
month = mar,
doi = "10.1002/mde.1436",
language = "English",
volume = "30",
pages = "71--82",
journal = "Managerial and Decision Economics",
issn = "0143-6570",
publisher = "John Wiley and Sons Ltd",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Delegation in a mixed oligopoly

T2 - the case of multiple private firms

AU - Heywood, John

AU - Ye, Guangliang

PY - 2009/3

Y1 - 2009/3

N2 - Previous research examining mixed duopolies shows that the use of an optimal incentive contract for the public firm increases welfare and that privatization reduces welfare. We demonstrate that these results do not generalize to a mixed oligopoly with multiple private firms. We derive the optimal incentive contract for a public firm that weighs both profit and welfare and show that its use may either increase or decrease welfare depending on the number of private firms and the exact nature of costs. We also identify the conditions that determine whether or not privatizing the public firm facing an optimal incentive contract reduces welfare.

AB - Previous research examining mixed duopolies shows that the use of an optimal incentive contract for the public firm increases welfare and that privatization reduces welfare. We demonstrate that these results do not generalize to a mixed oligopoly with multiple private firms. We derive the optimal incentive contract for a public firm that weighs both profit and welfare and show that its use may either increase or decrease welfare depending on the number of private firms and the exact nature of costs. We also identify the conditions that determine whether or not privatizing the public firm facing an optimal incentive contract reduces welfare.

U2 - 10.1002/mde.1436

DO - 10.1002/mde.1436

M3 - Journal article

VL - 30

SP - 71

EP - 82

JO - Managerial and Decision Economics

JF - Managerial and Decision Economics

SN - 0143-6570

IS - 2

ER -