Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Design of an optimal Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast protocol for ad hoc networks with rational nodes
AU - Suri, Neeraj
AU - Narahari, Y.
PY - 2008
Y1 - 2008
N2 - Nodes in an ad hoc wireless network incur certain costs for forwarding packets since packet forwarding consumes the resources of the nodes. If the nodes are rational, free packet forwarding by the nodes cannot be taken for granted and incentive based protocols are required to stimulate cooperation among the nodes. Existing incentive based approaches are based on the VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism which leads to high levels of incentive budgets and restricted applicability to only certain topologies of networks. Moreover, the existing approaches have only focused on unicast and multicast. Motivated by this, we propose an incentive based broadcast protocol that satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility and minimizes the incentive budgets required by the individual nodes. The proposed protocol, which we call BIC-B (Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast) protocol, also satisfies budget balance. We also derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the ex-post individual rationality of the BIC-B protocol. The BIC-B protocol exhibits superior performance in comparison to a dominant strategy incentive compatible broadcast protocol. © 2008 IEEE.
AB - Nodes in an ad hoc wireless network incur certain costs for forwarding packets since packet forwarding consumes the resources of the nodes. If the nodes are rational, free packet forwarding by the nodes cannot be taken for granted and incentive based protocols are required to stimulate cooperation among the nodes. Existing incentive based approaches are based on the VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism which leads to high levels of incentive budgets and restricted applicability to only certain topologies of networks. Moreover, the existing approaches have only focused on unicast and multicast. Motivated by this, we propose an incentive based broadcast protocol that satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility and minimizes the incentive budgets required by the individual nodes. The proposed protocol, which we call BIC-B (Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast) protocol, also satisfies budget balance. We also derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the ex-post individual rationality of the BIC-B protocol. The BIC-B protocol exhibits superior performance in comparison to a dominant strategy incentive compatible broadcast protocol. © 2008 IEEE.
KW - Ad hoc wireless networks
KW - Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast (BIC-B)
KW - Dominant strategy incentive compatible broadcast (DSIC-B)
KW - Incentive compatible broadcast (ICB), rationality
KW - Least cost path (LCP)
KW - Selfish nodes
KW - Ad hoc networks
KW - Bayesian networks
KW - Budget control
KW - Network protocols
KW - Radio broadcasting
KW - Wireless telecommunication systems
KW - Computer networks
U2 - 10.1109/JSAC.2008.080911
DO - 10.1109/JSAC.2008.080911
M3 - Journal article
VL - 26
SP - 1138
EP - 1148
JO - IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
JF - IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
SN - 0733-8716
IS - 7
ER -