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Design of an optimal Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast protocol for ad hoc networks with rational nodes

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Design of an optimal Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast protocol for ad hoc networks with rational nodes. / Suri, Neeraj; Narahari, Y.
In: IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, Vol. 26, No. 7, 2008, p. 1138-1148.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

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Suri, N & Narahari, Y 2008, 'Design of an optimal Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast protocol for ad hoc networks with rational nodes', IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 26, no. 7, pp. 1138-1148. https://doi.org/10.1109/JSAC.2008.080911

APA

Vancouver

Suri N, Narahari Y. Design of an optimal Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast protocol for ad hoc networks with rational nodes. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications. 2008;26(7):1138-1148. doi: 10.1109/JSAC.2008.080911

Author

Suri, Neeraj ; Narahari, Y. / Design of an optimal Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast protocol for ad hoc networks with rational nodes. In: IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications. 2008 ; Vol. 26, No. 7. pp. 1138-1148.

Bibtex

@article{1a8dd3ba0e654c5bab7032d459e91a8f,
title = "Design of an optimal Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast protocol for ad hoc networks with rational nodes",
abstract = "Nodes in an ad hoc wireless network incur certain costs for forwarding packets since packet forwarding consumes the resources of the nodes. If the nodes are rational, free packet forwarding by the nodes cannot be taken for granted and incentive based protocols are required to stimulate cooperation among the nodes. Existing incentive based approaches are based on the VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism which leads to high levels of incentive budgets and restricted applicability to only certain topologies of networks. Moreover, the existing approaches have only focused on unicast and multicast. Motivated by this, we propose an incentive based broadcast protocol that satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility and minimizes the incentive budgets required by the individual nodes. The proposed protocol, which we call BIC-B (Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast) protocol, also satisfies budget balance. We also derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the ex-post individual rationality of the BIC-B protocol. The BIC-B protocol exhibits superior performance in comparison to a dominant strategy incentive compatible broadcast protocol. {\textcopyright} 2008 IEEE.",
keywords = "Ad hoc wireless networks, Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast (BIC-B), Dominant strategy incentive compatible broadcast (DSIC-B), Incentive compatible broadcast (ICB), rationality, Least cost path (LCP), Selfish nodes, Ad hoc networks, Bayesian networks, Budget control, Network protocols, Radio broadcasting, Wireless telecommunication systems, Computer networks",
author = "Neeraj Suri and Y. Narahari",
year = "2008",
doi = "10.1109/JSAC.2008.080911",
language = "English",
volume = "26",
pages = "1138--1148",
journal = "IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications",
issn = "0733-8716",
publisher = "IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC",
number = "7",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Design of an optimal Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast protocol for ad hoc networks with rational nodes

AU - Suri, Neeraj

AU - Narahari, Y.

PY - 2008

Y1 - 2008

N2 - Nodes in an ad hoc wireless network incur certain costs for forwarding packets since packet forwarding consumes the resources of the nodes. If the nodes are rational, free packet forwarding by the nodes cannot be taken for granted and incentive based protocols are required to stimulate cooperation among the nodes. Existing incentive based approaches are based on the VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism which leads to high levels of incentive budgets and restricted applicability to only certain topologies of networks. Moreover, the existing approaches have only focused on unicast and multicast. Motivated by this, we propose an incentive based broadcast protocol that satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility and minimizes the incentive budgets required by the individual nodes. The proposed protocol, which we call BIC-B (Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast) protocol, also satisfies budget balance. We also derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the ex-post individual rationality of the BIC-B protocol. The BIC-B protocol exhibits superior performance in comparison to a dominant strategy incentive compatible broadcast protocol. © 2008 IEEE.

AB - Nodes in an ad hoc wireless network incur certain costs for forwarding packets since packet forwarding consumes the resources of the nodes. If the nodes are rational, free packet forwarding by the nodes cannot be taken for granted and incentive based protocols are required to stimulate cooperation among the nodes. Existing incentive based approaches are based on the VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism which leads to high levels of incentive budgets and restricted applicability to only certain topologies of networks. Moreover, the existing approaches have only focused on unicast and multicast. Motivated by this, we propose an incentive based broadcast protocol that satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility and minimizes the incentive budgets required by the individual nodes. The proposed protocol, which we call BIC-B (Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast) protocol, also satisfies budget balance. We also derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the ex-post individual rationality of the BIC-B protocol. The BIC-B protocol exhibits superior performance in comparison to a dominant strategy incentive compatible broadcast protocol. © 2008 IEEE.

KW - Ad hoc wireless networks

KW - Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast (BIC-B)

KW - Dominant strategy incentive compatible broadcast (DSIC-B)

KW - Incentive compatible broadcast (ICB), rationality

KW - Least cost path (LCP)

KW - Selfish nodes

KW - Ad hoc networks

KW - Bayesian networks

KW - Budget control

KW - Network protocols

KW - Radio broadcasting

KW - Wireless telecommunication systems

KW - Computer networks

U2 - 10.1109/JSAC.2008.080911

DO - 10.1109/JSAC.2008.080911

M3 - Journal article

VL - 26

SP - 1138

EP - 1148

JO - IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications

JF - IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications

SN - 0733-8716

IS - 7

ER -