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Do Better Informed Investors Always Do Better?: A Buyback Puzzle

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Do Better Informed Investors Always Do Better? A Buyback Puzzle. / Boyle, Glenn; Ward, Gerald.
In: Economic Inquiry, Vol. 56, No. 4, 29.08.2018, p. 2137-2157.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

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Boyle G, Ward G. Do Better Informed Investors Always Do Better? A Buyback Puzzle. Economic Inquiry. 2018 Aug 29;56(4):2137-2157. Epub 2018 May 11. doi: 10.1111/ecin.12688

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Boyle, Glenn ; Ward, Gerald. / Do Better Informed Investors Always Do Better? A Buyback Puzzle. In: Economic Inquiry. 2018 ; Vol. 56, No. 4. pp. 2137-2157.

Bibtex

@article{2a6a3a41d4cf415abcedb459ab623c75,
title = "Do Better Informed Investors Always Do Better?: A Buyback Puzzle",
abstract = "We explore the value of private investment information using data from a singular source: auctions of yearling racehorses. Horse breeders possess superior information about their own horses and have strong financial incentives to buy the best of these back at auction. However, those they repurchase subsequently perform significantly worse on average, earning 30% less at the racetrack than horses purchased by outsiders. Moreover, this underperformance is concentrated in male horses, despite these being purchased exclusively for racing purposes. These puzzling findings cannot be explained by differences in horse risk or breeder abilities, or by nonfinancial objectives, or by behavioral or selection biases. ",
author = "Glenn Boyle and Gerald Ward",
year = "2018",
month = aug,
day = "29",
doi = "10.1111/ecin.12688",
language = "English",
volume = "56",
pages = "2137--2157",
journal = "Economic Inquiry",
issn = "0095-2583",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Do Better Informed Investors Always Do Better?

T2 - A Buyback Puzzle

AU - Boyle, Glenn

AU - Ward, Gerald

PY - 2018/8/29

Y1 - 2018/8/29

N2 - We explore the value of private investment information using data from a singular source: auctions of yearling racehorses. Horse breeders possess superior information about their own horses and have strong financial incentives to buy the best of these back at auction. However, those they repurchase subsequently perform significantly worse on average, earning 30% less at the racetrack than horses purchased by outsiders. Moreover, this underperformance is concentrated in male horses, despite these being purchased exclusively for racing purposes. These puzzling findings cannot be explained by differences in horse risk or breeder abilities, or by nonfinancial objectives, or by behavioral or selection biases.

AB - We explore the value of private investment information using data from a singular source: auctions of yearling racehorses. Horse breeders possess superior information about their own horses and have strong financial incentives to buy the best of these back at auction. However, those they repurchase subsequently perform significantly worse on average, earning 30% less at the racetrack than horses purchased by outsiders. Moreover, this underperformance is concentrated in male horses, despite these being purchased exclusively for racing purposes. These puzzling findings cannot be explained by differences in horse risk or breeder abilities, or by nonfinancial objectives, or by behavioral or selection biases.

U2 - 10.1111/ecin.12688

DO - 10.1111/ecin.12688

M3 - Journal article

VL - 56

SP - 2137

EP - 2157

JO - Economic Inquiry

JF - Economic Inquiry

SN - 0095-2583

IS - 4

ER -