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  • Do Compensation Consultants Drive Up CEO Pay

    Rights statement: This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Conyon, M. J., Hass, L. H., Peck, S. I., Sadler, G. V. and Zhang, Z. (2019), Do Compensation Consultants Drive Up CEO Pay? Evidence from UK Public Firms. Brit J Manage, 30: 10-29. doi:10.1111/1467-8551.12307 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-8551.12307 This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.

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Do Compensation Consultants Drive Up CEO Pay?: Evidence from UK Public Firms

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Do Compensation Consultants Drive Up CEO Pay? Evidence from UK Public Firms. / Conyon, Martin James; Hass, Lars Helge; Peck, Simon; Sadler, Graham; Zhang, Zhifang.

In: British Journal of Management, Vol. 30, No. 1, 30.01.2019, p. 10-29.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

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Conyon, Martin James ; Hass, Lars Helge ; Peck, Simon ; Sadler, Graham ; Zhang, Zhifang. / Do Compensation Consultants Drive Up CEO Pay? Evidence from UK Public Firms. In: British Journal of Management. 2019 ; Vol. 30, No. 1. pp. 10-29.

Bibtex

@article{dcee15186fc840d5ac9f073af40bfd6e,
title = "Do Compensation Consultants Drive Up CEO Pay?: Evidence from UK Public Firms",
abstract = "Do compensation consultants drive up CEO pay for the benefit of managers, or do they design pay packages to benefit firm owners? Using a large sample of UK firms from the FTSE All‐Share Index over the 2003–2011 period, we show a positive correlation between the presence of compensation consultants and CEO pay. Importantly, isolating this effect is somewhat dependent on the endogenous selection of consultants and the statistical modelling strategy deployed. We find evidence that compensation consultants improve CEO compensation design when their expertise is of greater importance (e.g. during the post‐financial crisis period, or for firms that have particularly weak compensation policies). In addition, our findings show that compensation consultants increase CEO pay–performance sensitivity. The balance of evidence supports optimal contracting theory more than managerial power theory, but the authors caution the limits to this verification. We are careful to note that the more compelling evidence for the positive effect of pay consultants on CEOs is based on advanced methods (such as propensity score matching and difference‐in‐differences), and that more standard approaches (such as OLS and fixed effects) are unlikely to reveal the same level of causality of consultants on CEO pay.",
author = "Conyon, {Martin James} and Hass, {Lars Helge} and Simon Peck and Graham Sadler and Zhifang Zhang",
note = "This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Conyon, M. J., Hass, L. H., Peck, S. I., Sadler, G. V. and Zhang, Z. (2019), Do Compensation Consultants Drive Up CEO Pay? Evidence from UK Public Firms. Brit J Manage, 30: 10-29. doi:10.1111/1467-8551.12307 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-8551.12307 This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.",
year = "2019",
month = jan,
day = "30",
doi = "10.1111/1467-8551.12307",
language = "English",
volume = "30",
pages = "10--29",
journal = "British Journal of Management",
issn = "1045-3172",
publisher = "Blackwell Publishing Ltd",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Do Compensation Consultants Drive Up CEO Pay?

T2 - Evidence from UK Public Firms

AU - Conyon, Martin James

AU - Hass, Lars Helge

AU - Peck, Simon

AU - Sadler, Graham

AU - Zhang, Zhifang

N1 - This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Conyon, M. J., Hass, L. H., Peck, S. I., Sadler, G. V. and Zhang, Z. (2019), Do Compensation Consultants Drive Up CEO Pay? Evidence from UK Public Firms. Brit J Manage, 30: 10-29. doi:10.1111/1467-8551.12307 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-8551.12307 This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.

PY - 2019/1/30

Y1 - 2019/1/30

N2 - Do compensation consultants drive up CEO pay for the benefit of managers, or do they design pay packages to benefit firm owners? Using a large sample of UK firms from the FTSE All‐Share Index over the 2003–2011 period, we show a positive correlation between the presence of compensation consultants and CEO pay. Importantly, isolating this effect is somewhat dependent on the endogenous selection of consultants and the statistical modelling strategy deployed. We find evidence that compensation consultants improve CEO compensation design when their expertise is of greater importance (e.g. during the post‐financial crisis period, or for firms that have particularly weak compensation policies). In addition, our findings show that compensation consultants increase CEO pay–performance sensitivity. The balance of evidence supports optimal contracting theory more than managerial power theory, but the authors caution the limits to this verification. We are careful to note that the more compelling evidence for the positive effect of pay consultants on CEOs is based on advanced methods (such as propensity score matching and difference‐in‐differences), and that more standard approaches (such as OLS and fixed effects) are unlikely to reveal the same level of causality of consultants on CEO pay.

AB - Do compensation consultants drive up CEO pay for the benefit of managers, or do they design pay packages to benefit firm owners? Using a large sample of UK firms from the FTSE All‐Share Index over the 2003–2011 period, we show a positive correlation between the presence of compensation consultants and CEO pay. Importantly, isolating this effect is somewhat dependent on the endogenous selection of consultants and the statistical modelling strategy deployed. We find evidence that compensation consultants improve CEO compensation design when their expertise is of greater importance (e.g. during the post‐financial crisis period, or for firms that have particularly weak compensation policies). In addition, our findings show that compensation consultants increase CEO pay–performance sensitivity. The balance of evidence supports optimal contracting theory more than managerial power theory, but the authors caution the limits to this verification. We are careful to note that the more compelling evidence for the positive effect of pay consultants on CEOs is based on advanced methods (such as propensity score matching and difference‐in‐differences), and that more standard approaches (such as OLS and fixed effects) are unlikely to reveal the same level of causality of consultants on CEO pay.

U2 - 10.1111/1467-8551.12307

DO - 10.1111/1467-8551.12307

M3 - Journal article

VL - 30

SP - 10

EP - 29

JO - British Journal of Management

JF - British Journal of Management

SN - 1045-3172

IS - 1

ER -