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Does reporting transparency affect industry coordination?: Evidence from the duration of international cartels

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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Does reporting transparency affect industry coordination? Evidence from the duration of international cartels. / Goncharov, Igor; Peter, Caspar David.
In: The Accounting Review, Vol. 94, No. 3, 01.05.2019, p. 149-175.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Goncharov, I & Peter, CD 2019, 'Does reporting transparency affect industry coordination? Evidence from the duration of international cartels', The Accounting Review, vol. 94, no. 3, pp. 149-175. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-52201

APA

Goncharov, I., & Peter, C. D. (2019). Does reporting transparency affect industry coordination? Evidence from the duration of international cartels. The Accounting Review, 94(3), 149-175. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-52201

Vancouver

Goncharov I, Peter CD. Does reporting transparency affect industry coordination? Evidence from the duration of international cartels. The Accounting Review. 2019 May 1;94(3):149-175. Epub 2018 Jul 27. doi: 10.2308/accr-52201

Author

Goncharov, Igor ; Peter, Caspar David. / Does reporting transparency affect industry coordination? Evidence from the duration of international cartels. In: The Accounting Review. 2019 ; Vol. 94, No. 3. pp. 149-175.

Bibtex

@article{eeb6dd347e36416d8c2c2419b1a40f02,
title = "Does reporting transparency affect industry coordination?: Evidence from the duration of international cartels",
abstract = "Firms coordinate their actions with industry peers, thereby affecting product market competition. Using the cartel setting, we investigate how financial reporting transparency affects industry coordination. Economic theory predicts that transparency might either prolong cartel duration through increased contracting efficiency or destabilize cartels due to earlier detection of deviating members. We test these predictions on firms indicted by the European Commission for anticompetitive behavior between 1980 and 2010. Using reporting under internationally recognized accounting standards (IFRS or U.S. GAAP) as our measure of reporting transparency, we find that following a transparent accounting framework decreases cartel duration. We show that this finding is partly explained by transparent segment disclosure, which provides a means for the verification of agreed-upon sales for a given product or region. Consistent with the view that transparent reporting leads to earlier detection of deviating members, we further show that transparency lowers cartel duration when the likelihood of cheating is high.",
keywords = "reporting transparency, IFRS, cartels",
author = "Igor Goncharov and Peter, {Caspar David}",
year = "2019",
month = may,
day = "1",
doi = "10.2308/accr-52201",
language = "English",
volume = "94",
pages = "149--175",
journal = "The Accounting Review",
issn = "0001-4826",
publisher = "American Accounting Association",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Does reporting transparency affect industry coordination?

T2 - Evidence from the duration of international cartels

AU - Goncharov, Igor

AU - Peter, Caspar David

PY - 2019/5/1

Y1 - 2019/5/1

N2 - Firms coordinate their actions with industry peers, thereby affecting product market competition. Using the cartel setting, we investigate how financial reporting transparency affects industry coordination. Economic theory predicts that transparency might either prolong cartel duration through increased contracting efficiency or destabilize cartels due to earlier detection of deviating members. We test these predictions on firms indicted by the European Commission for anticompetitive behavior between 1980 and 2010. Using reporting under internationally recognized accounting standards (IFRS or U.S. GAAP) as our measure of reporting transparency, we find that following a transparent accounting framework decreases cartel duration. We show that this finding is partly explained by transparent segment disclosure, which provides a means for the verification of agreed-upon sales for a given product or region. Consistent with the view that transparent reporting leads to earlier detection of deviating members, we further show that transparency lowers cartel duration when the likelihood of cheating is high.

AB - Firms coordinate their actions with industry peers, thereby affecting product market competition. Using the cartel setting, we investigate how financial reporting transparency affects industry coordination. Economic theory predicts that transparency might either prolong cartel duration through increased contracting efficiency or destabilize cartels due to earlier detection of deviating members. We test these predictions on firms indicted by the European Commission for anticompetitive behavior between 1980 and 2010. Using reporting under internationally recognized accounting standards (IFRS or U.S. GAAP) as our measure of reporting transparency, we find that following a transparent accounting framework decreases cartel duration. We show that this finding is partly explained by transparent segment disclosure, which provides a means for the verification of agreed-upon sales for a given product or region. Consistent with the view that transparent reporting leads to earlier detection of deviating members, we further show that transparency lowers cartel duration when the likelihood of cheating is high.

KW - reporting transparency

KW - IFRS

KW - cartels

U2 - 10.2308/accr-52201

DO - 10.2308/accr-52201

M3 - Journal article

VL - 94

SP - 149

EP - 175

JO - The Accounting Review

JF - The Accounting Review

SN - 0001-4826

IS - 3

ER -