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    Rights statement: This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Games and Economic Behavior. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Games and Economic Behavior, 99, 2016 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.07.001

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Duplicative search

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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Duplicative search. / Matros, Alexander; Smirnov, Vladimir.
In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 99, 09.2016, p. 1-22.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Matros, A & Smirnov, V 2016, 'Duplicative search', Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 99, pp. 1-22. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.07.001

APA

Matros, A., & Smirnov, V. (2016). Duplicative search. Games and Economic Behavior, 99, 1-22. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.07.001

Vancouver

Matros A, Smirnov V. Duplicative search. Games and Economic Behavior. 2016 Sept;99:1-22. Epub 2016 Jul 13. doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.07.001

Author

Matros, Alexander ; Smirnov, Vladimir. / Duplicative search. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2016 ; Vol. 99. pp. 1-22.

Bibtex

@article{0afc0081f74a4b7e96ba20eb2ebe4a25,
title = "Duplicative search",
abstract = "In this paper we examine the dynamic search of two rivals looking for a prize of known value that is hidden in an unknown location, modeled as search for treasure on an island. In every period, the players choose how much to search of the previously unsearched portion of the island in a winner-takes-all contest. If the players cannot coordinate so as to avoid searching the same locations, the unique equilibrium involves complete dissipation of rents. On the other hand, if the players have some (even limited) ability to coordinate so as to avoid duplicative search and the search area is sufficiently small, there is a unique equilibrium in which the full area is searched and each player earns a positive expected return.",
keywords = "R&D, Search, Duplication, Uncertainty, Coordination",
author = "Alexander Matros and Vladimir Smirnov",
note = "This is the author{\textquoteright}s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Games and Economic Behavior. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Games and Economic Behavior, 99, 2016 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.07.001",
year = "2016",
month = sep,
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2016.07.001",
language = "English",
volume = "99",
pages = "1--22",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "ELSEVIER ACADEMIC PRESS INC",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Duplicative search

AU - Matros, Alexander

AU - Smirnov, Vladimir

N1 - This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Games and Economic Behavior. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Games and Economic Behavior, 99, 2016 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.07.001

PY - 2016/9

Y1 - 2016/9

N2 - In this paper we examine the dynamic search of two rivals looking for a prize of known value that is hidden in an unknown location, modeled as search for treasure on an island. In every period, the players choose how much to search of the previously unsearched portion of the island in a winner-takes-all contest. If the players cannot coordinate so as to avoid searching the same locations, the unique equilibrium involves complete dissipation of rents. On the other hand, if the players have some (even limited) ability to coordinate so as to avoid duplicative search and the search area is sufficiently small, there is a unique equilibrium in which the full area is searched and each player earns a positive expected return.

AB - In this paper we examine the dynamic search of two rivals looking for a prize of known value that is hidden in an unknown location, modeled as search for treasure on an island. In every period, the players choose how much to search of the previously unsearched portion of the island in a winner-takes-all contest. If the players cannot coordinate so as to avoid searching the same locations, the unique equilibrium involves complete dissipation of rents. On the other hand, if the players have some (even limited) ability to coordinate so as to avoid duplicative search and the search area is sufficiently small, there is a unique equilibrium in which the full area is searched and each player earns a positive expected return.

KW - R&D

KW - Search

KW - Duplication

KW - Uncertainty

KW - Coordination

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2016.07.001

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2016.07.001

M3 - Journal article

VL - 99

SP - 1

EP - 22

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

ER -