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Efficient mechanisms for multiple public goods

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Efficient mechanisms for multiple public goods. / Mutuswami, S.; Winter, E.
In: Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 88, No. 3-4, 03.2004, p. 629-644.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Mutuswami, S & Winter, E 2004, 'Efficient mechanisms for multiple public goods', Journal of Public Economics, vol. 88, no. 3-4, pp. 629-644. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00218-9

APA

Mutuswami, S., & Winter, E. (2004). Efficient mechanisms for multiple public goods. Journal of Public Economics, 88(3-4), 629-644. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00218-9

Vancouver

Mutuswami S, Winter E. Efficient mechanisms for multiple public goods. Journal of Public Economics. 2004 Mar;88(3-4):629-644. doi: 10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00218-9

Author

Mutuswami, S. ; Winter, E. / Efficient mechanisms for multiple public goods. In: Journal of Public Economics. 2004 ; Vol. 88, No. 3-4. pp. 629-644.

Bibtex

@article{b2296d55ea8145bc8a15fa029c455b80,
title = "Efficient mechanisms for multiple public goods",
abstract = "We propose two sequential mechanisms for efficient production of public goods. Our analysis differs from the existing literature in allowing for the presence of multiple public goods and in also being 'simple'. While both mechanisms ensure efficiency, the payoffs in the first mechanism are asymmetric, being sensitive to the order in which agents move. The second mechanism corrects for this through a two-stage game where the order of moves in the second stage is randomly determined. The payoffs from the second mechanism correspond to the Shapley value of a well-defined game which summarizes the production opportunities available to coalitions in the economy. {\textcopyright} 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.",
keywords = "Mechanism design, Public goods, Shapley value",
author = "S. Mutuswami and E. Winter",
year = "2004",
month = mar,
doi = "10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00218-9",
language = "English",
volume = "88",
pages = "629--644",
journal = "Journal of Public Economics",
issn = "0047-2727",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "3-4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Efficient mechanisms for multiple public goods

AU - Mutuswami, S.

AU - Winter, E.

PY - 2004/3

Y1 - 2004/3

N2 - We propose two sequential mechanisms for efficient production of public goods. Our analysis differs from the existing literature in allowing for the presence of multiple public goods and in also being 'simple'. While both mechanisms ensure efficiency, the payoffs in the first mechanism are asymmetric, being sensitive to the order in which agents move. The second mechanism corrects for this through a two-stage game where the order of moves in the second stage is randomly determined. The payoffs from the second mechanism correspond to the Shapley value of a well-defined game which summarizes the production opportunities available to coalitions in the economy. © 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

AB - We propose two sequential mechanisms for efficient production of public goods. Our analysis differs from the existing literature in allowing for the presence of multiple public goods and in also being 'simple'. While both mechanisms ensure efficiency, the payoffs in the first mechanism are asymmetric, being sensitive to the order in which agents move. The second mechanism corrects for this through a two-stage game where the order of moves in the second stage is randomly determined. The payoffs from the second mechanism correspond to the Shapley value of a well-defined game which summarizes the production opportunities available to coalitions in the economy. © 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

KW - Mechanism design

KW - Public goods

KW - Shapley value

U2 - 10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00218-9

DO - 10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00218-9

M3 - Journal article

VL - 88

SP - 629

EP - 644

JO - Journal of Public Economics

JF - Journal of Public Economics

SN - 0047-2727

IS - 3-4

ER -