Final published version, 1.11 MB, PDF document
Available under license: CC BY: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
Research output: Working paper
Research output: Working paper
}
TY - UNPB
T1 - Efficient Public Good Provision in a Multipolar World
AU - Anwar, Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib
AU - Bruno, Jorge
AU - Foucart, Renaud
AU - Sen Gupta, Sonali
PY - 2023/3/5
Y1 - 2023/3/5
N2 - We model a public goods game with groups, position uncertainty, and observationallearning. Contributions are simultaneous within groups, but groups play sequentially based on their observation of an incomplete sample of past contributions.We show that full cooperation between and within groups is possible with self-interested players on a fixed horizon. Position uncertainty implies the existence of an equilibrium where groups of players conditionally cooperate in the hope of influencing further groups. Conditional cooperation implies that each group member is pivotal, so that efficient simultaneous provision within groups is an equilibrium.
AB - We model a public goods game with groups, position uncertainty, and observationallearning. Contributions are simultaneous within groups, but groups play sequentially based on their observation of an incomplete sample of past contributions.We show that full cooperation between and within groups is possible with self-interested players on a fixed horizon. Position uncertainty implies the existence of an equilibrium where groups of players conditionally cooperate in the hope of influencing further groups. Conditional cooperation implies that each group member is pivotal, so that efficient simultaneous provision within groups is an equilibrium.
KW - Public Goods
KW - Groups
KW - Position Uncertainty
KW - Voluntary Contributions
M3 - Working paper
T3 - Economics Working Papers Series
BT - Efficient Public Good Provision in a Multipolar World
PB - Lancaster University, Department of Economics
ER -