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Electoral Competition in 2-Dimensional Ideology Space with Unidimensional Commitment

Research output: Working paper

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Electoral Competition in 2-Dimensional Ideology Space with Unidimensional Commitment. / Dziubinski, Marcin; Roy, Jaideep.
Lancaster University: The Department of Economics, 2009. (Economics Working Paper Series).

Research output: Working paper

Harvard

Dziubinski, M & Roy, J 2009 'Electoral Competition in 2-Dimensional Ideology Space with Unidimensional Commitment' Economics Working Paper Series, The Department of Economics, Lancaster University.

APA

Dziubinski, M., & Roy, J. (2009). Electoral Competition in 2-Dimensional Ideology Space with Unidimensional Commitment. (Economics Working Paper Series). The Department of Economics.

Vancouver

Dziubinski M, Roy J. Electoral Competition in 2-Dimensional Ideology Space with Unidimensional Commitment. Lancaster University: The Department of Economics. 2009. (Economics Working Paper Series).

Author

Dziubinski, Marcin ; Roy, Jaideep. / Electoral Competition in 2-Dimensional Ideology Space with Unidimensional Commitment. Lancaster University : The Department of Economics, 2009. (Economics Working Paper Series).

Bibtex

@techreport{a88926e0b4f941f18a7f1b87249ad42b,
title = "Electoral Competition in 2-Dimensional Ideology Space with Unidimensional Commitment",
abstract = "We study a model of political competition between two candidates with two orthogonal issues, where candidates are office motivated and committed to a particular position in one of the dimensions, while having the freedom to select (credibly) any position on the other dimension. We analyse two settings: a homogeneous one, where both candidates are committed to the same dimension and a heterogeneous one, where each candidate is committed to a different dimension. We characterise and give necessary and suffcient conditions for existence of convergent and divergent Nash equilibria for distributions with a non-empty and an empty core. We identify a special point in the ideology space which we call a strict median, existence of which is strictly related to existence of divergent Nash equilibria. A central conclusion of our analysis is that for divergent equilibria, strong extremism (or differentiation) seems to be an important equilibrium feature.",
keywords = "Spatial Voting, Two Issues, Uni-Dimensional Commitment, StrictMedian, Extremism",
author = "Marcin Dziubinski and Jaideep Roy",
year = "2009",
language = "English",
series = "Economics Working Paper Series",
publisher = "The Department of Economics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "The Department of Economics",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Electoral Competition in 2-Dimensional Ideology Space with Unidimensional Commitment

AU - Dziubinski, Marcin

AU - Roy, Jaideep

PY - 2009

Y1 - 2009

N2 - We study a model of political competition between two candidates with two orthogonal issues, where candidates are office motivated and committed to a particular position in one of the dimensions, while having the freedom to select (credibly) any position on the other dimension. We analyse two settings: a homogeneous one, where both candidates are committed to the same dimension and a heterogeneous one, where each candidate is committed to a different dimension. We characterise and give necessary and suffcient conditions for existence of convergent and divergent Nash equilibria for distributions with a non-empty and an empty core. We identify a special point in the ideology space which we call a strict median, existence of which is strictly related to existence of divergent Nash equilibria. A central conclusion of our analysis is that for divergent equilibria, strong extremism (or differentiation) seems to be an important equilibrium feature.

AB - We study a model of political competition between two candidates with two orthogonal issues, where candidates are office motivated and committed to a particular position in one of the dimensions, while having the freedom to select (credibly) any position on the other dimension. We analyse two settings: a homogeneous one, where both candidates are committed to the same dimension and a heterogeneous one, where each candidate is committed to a different dimension. We characterise and give necessary and suffcient conditions for existence of convergent and divergent Nash equilibria for distributions with a non-empty and an empty core. We identify a special point in the ideology space which we call a strict median, existence of which is strictly related to existence of divergent Nash equilibria. A central conclusion of our analysis is that for divergent equilibria, strong extremism (or differentiation) seems to be an important equilibrium feature.

KW - Spatial Voting

KW - Two Issues

KW - Uni-Dimensional Commitment

KW - StrictMedian

KW - Extremism

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Economics Working Paper Series

BT - Electoral Competition in 2-Dimensional Ideology Space with Unidimensional Commitment

PB - The Department of Economics

CY - Lancaster University

ER -