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    Rights statement: © 2018 by the Southern Political Science Association. All rights reserved.

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Electoral competition with primaries and quality asymmetries

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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Electoral competition with primaries and quality asymmetries. / Grofman, Bernard; Troumpounis, Orestis; Xefteris, Dimitrios.
In: Journal of Politics, Vol. 81, No. 1, 01.2019, p. 260-273.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Grofman, B, Troumpounis, O & Xefteris, D 2019, 'Electoral competition with primaries and quality asymmetries', Journal of Politics, vol. 81, no. 1, pp. 260-273. https://doi.org/10.1086/700271

APA

Grofman, B., Troumpounis, O., & Xefteris, D. (2019). Electoral competition with primaries and quality asymmetries. Journal of Politics, 81(1), 260-273. https://doi.org/10.1086/700271

Vancouver

Grofman B, Troumpounis O, Xefteris D. Electoral competition with primaries and quality asymmetries. Journal of Politics. 2019 Jan;81(1):260-273. Epub 2018 Nov 7. doi: 10.1086/700271

Author

Grofman, Bernard ; Troumpounis, Orestis ; Xefteris, Dimitrios. / Electoral competition with primaries and quality asymmetries. In: Journal of Politics. 2019 ; Vol. 81, No. 1. pp. 260-273.

Bibtex

@article{fdc542f041b24254ad50cf570b94d7ca,
title = "Electoral competition with primaries and quality asymmetries",
abstract = "In two-dimensional two-party electoral competition under plurality rule, there are typically no equilibria, even when one of the dimensions refers to valence. The good news is that the introduction of either closed or open primaries acts as a stabilizing force since equilibria exist quite generally, serves as an arena for policy debates since all candidates propose differentiated platforms, and guarantees that each party's nominee is of higher quality than its primary opponent. Moreover, primaries tend to benefit the party whose median voter is closer to the overall median. The bad news is that the winner of the general election need not be the candidate with the highest overall quality since too competitive primaries can prove harmful. Given the differences between open and closed primaries, we show that the choice of primary type is particularly important and may determine the winner of the general election.",
keywords = "Downsian model, primaries, valence, open primaries, closed primaries",
author = "Bernard Grofman and Orestis Troumpounis and Dimitrios Xefteris",
note = "{\textcopyright} 2018 by the Southern Political Science Association. All rights reserved.",
year = "2019",
month = jan,
doi = "10.1086/700271",
language = "English",
volume = "81",
pages = "260--273",
journal = "Journal of Politics",
issn = "0022-3816",
publisher = "University of Chicago Press",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Electoral competition with primaries and quality asymmetries

AU - Grofman, Bernard

AU - Troumpounis, Orestis

AU - Xefteris, Dimitrios

N1 - © 2018 by the Southern Political Science Association. All rights reserved.

PY - 2019/1

Y1 - 2019/1

N2 - In two-dimensional two-party electoral competition under plurality rule, there are typically no equilibria, even when one of the dimensions refers to valence. The good news is that the introduction of either closed or open primaries acts as a stabilizing force since equilibria exist quite generally, serves as an arena for policy debates since all candidates propose differentiated platforms, and guarantees that each party's nominee is of higher quality than its primary opponent. Moreover, primaries tend to benefit the party whose median voter is closer to the overall median. The bad news is that the winner of the general election need not be the candidate with the highest overall quality since too competitive primaries can prove harmful. Given the differences between open and closed primaries, we show that the choice of primary type is particularly important and may determine the winner of the general election.

AB - In two-dimensional two-party electoral competition under plurality rule, there are typically no equilibria, even when one of the dimensions refers to valence. The good news is that the introduction of either closed or open primaries acts as a stabilizing force since equilibria exist quite generally, serves as an arena for policy debates since all candidates propose differentiated platforms, and guarantees that each party's nominee is of higher quality than its primary opponent. Moreover, primaries tend to benefit the party whose median voter is closer to the overall median. The bad news is that the winner of the general election need not be the candidate with the highest overall quality since too competitive primaries can prove harmful. Given the differences between open and closed primaries, we show that the choice of primary type is particularly important and may determine the winner of the general election.

KW - Downsian model

KW - primaries

KW - valence

KW - open primaries

KW - closed primaries

U2 - 10.1086/700271

DO - 10.1086/700271

M3 - Journal article

VL - 81

SP - 260

EP - 273

JO - Journal of Politics

JF - Journal of Politics

SN - 0022-3816

IS - 1

ER -