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Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion

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Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion. / Matakos, Konstantinos; Savolainen, Riikka; Troumpounis, Orestis et al.
In: Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, Vol. 2, No. 4, 30.11.2024.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Matakos, K, Savolainen, R, Troumpounis, O, Tukiainen , J & Xefteris, D 2024, 'Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion', Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, vol. 2, no. 4. https://doi.org/10.1086/731286

APA

Matakos, K., Savolainen, R., Troumpounis, O., Tukiainen , J., & Xefteris, D. (2024). Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion. Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, 2(4). https://doi.org/10.1086/731286

Vancouver

Matakos K, Savolainen R, Troumpounis O, Tukiainen J, Xefteris D. Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion. Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics. 2024 Nov 30;2(4). Epub 2024 Sept 17. doi: 10.1086/731286

Author

Matakos, Konstantinos ; Savolainen, Riikka ; Troumpounis, Orestis et al. / Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion. In: Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics. 2024 ; Vol. 2, No. 4.

Bibtex

@article{5c5f5f8e04304f1a9a04ce46086e2317,
title = "Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion",
abstract = "By utilizing unique data capturing candidates{\textquoteright} ideological positions in Finnish municipal elections and leveraging exogenous changes in council size at different population thresholds as a proxy for electoral rule disproportionality and the expected advantage to the election winner, we identify a positive effect of council size on party cohesion. We propose the following mechanism: if a more diverse set of candidates is electorally appealing but less efficient in serving policy-related goals, parties face weaker incentives to maintain cohesion in institutional settings, such as smaller councils, which reward higher vote shares more generously.",
author = "Konstantinos Matakos and Riikka Savolainen and Orestis Troumpounis and Janne Tukiainen and Dimitrios Xefteris",
year = "2024",
month = nov,
day = "30",
doi = "10.1086/731286",
language = "English",
volume = "2",
journal = "Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics",
issn = "2832-9368",
publisher = "University of Chicago Press",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion

AU - Matakos, Konstantinos

AU - Savolainen, Riikka

AU - Troumpounis, Orestis

AU - Tukiainen , Janne

AU - Xefteris, Dimitrios

PY - 2024/11/30

Y1 - 2024/11/30

N2 - By utilizing unique data capturing candidates’ ideological positions in Finnish municipal elections and leveraging exogenous changes in council size at different population thresholds as a proxy for electoral rule disproportionality and the expected advantage to the election winner, we identify a positive effect of council size on party cohesion. We propose the following mechanism: if a more diverse set of candidates is electorally appealing but less efficient in serving policy-related goals, parties face weaker incentives to maintain cohesion in institutional settings, such as smaller councils, which reward higher vote shares more generously.

AB - By utilizing unique data capturing candidates’ ideological positions in Finnish municipal elections and leveraging exogenous changes in council size at different population thresholds as a proxy for electoral rule disproportionality and the expected advantage to the election winner, we identify a positive effect of council size on party cohesion. We propose the following mechanism: if a more diverse set of candidates is electorally appealing but less efficient in serving policy-related goals, parties face weaker incentives to maintain cohesion in institutional settings, such as smaller councils, which reward higher vote shares more generously.

U2 - 10.1086/731286

DO - 10.1086/731286

M3 - Journal article

VL - 2

JO - Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics

JF - Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics

SN - 2832-9368

IS - 4

ER -