Rights statement: This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Matakos, K., Troumpounis, O. and Xefteris, D. (2016), Electoral Rule Disproportionality and Platform Polarization. American Journal of Political Science, 60: 1026–1043. doi:10.1111/ajps.12235 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12235/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
Accepted author manuscript, 1.16 MB, PDF document
Available under license: CC BY: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
Final published version
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Electoral rule disproportionality and platform polarization
AU - Matakos, Konstantinos
AU - Troumpounis, Orestis
AU - Xefteris, Dimitrios
N1 - This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Matakos, K., Troumpounis, O. and Xefteris, D. (2016), Electoral Rule Disproportionality and Platform Polarization. American Journal of Political Science, 60: 1026–1043. doi:10.1111/ajps.12235 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12235/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
PY - 2016/10
Y1 - 2016/10
N2 - Despite common perception, existing theoretical literature lacks a complete for-mal argument regarding the relationship between the electoral rule disproportionality and platform polarization. In this paper, we build a model that incorporates the disproportionality of the electoral system in a standard Downsian electoral competition setup with mainly, but not necessarily purely, policy-motivated parties.We first show that in equilibrium, platform polarization is decreasing in the levelof the electoral rule disproportionality. We then argue that the number of partieshas a positive effect on platform polarization when polarization is measured bythe distance between the two most distant platforms. This effect does not holdwhen polarization is measured by the widely used Dalton index. Constructing adataset covering more than 300 elections, our main theoretical findings are empirically supported, pointing towards the electoral rule disproportionality as a major determinant of polarization.
AB - Despite common perception, existing theoretical literature lacks a complete for-mal argument regarding the relationship between the electoral rule disproportionality and platform polarization. In this paper, we build a model that incorporates the disproportionality of the electoral system in a standard Downsian electoral competition setup with mainly, but not necessarily purely, policy-motivated parties.We first show that in equilibrium, platform polarization is decreasing in the levelof the electoral rule disproportionality. We then argue that the number of partieshas a positive effect on platform polarization when polarization is measured bythe distance between the two most distant platforms. This effect does not holdwhen polarization is measured by the widely used Dalton index. Constructing adataset covering more than 300 elections, our main theoretical findings are empirically supported, pointing towards the electoral rule disproportionality as a major determinant of polarization.
U2 - 10.1111/ajps.12235
DO - 10.1111/ajps.12235
M3 - Journal article
VL - 60
SP - 1026
EP - 1043
JO - American Journal of Political Science
JF - American Journal of Political Science
SN - 0092-5853
IS - 4
ER -