Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > Endogenous two-sided markets with repeated tran...

Research

Links

Text available via DOI:

Keywords

View graph of relations

Endogenous two-sided markets with repeated transactions

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Published

Standard

Endogenous two-sided markets with repeated transactions. / Polanski, A.; Winter, E.
In: B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2010.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Polanski, A & Winter, E 2010, 'Endogenous two-sided markets with repeated transactions', B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, vol. 10, no. 1. https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1632

APA

Polanski, A., & Winter, E. (2010). Endogenous two-sided markets with repeated transactions. B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 10(1). https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1632

Vancouver

Polanski A, Winter E. Endogenous two-sided markets with repeated transactions. B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. 2010;10(1). doi: 10.2202/1935-1704.1632

Author

Polanski, A. ; Winter, E. / Endogenous two-sided markets with repeated transactions. In: B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. 2010 ; Vol. 10, No. 1.

Bibtex

@article{6088c63f702a4af1b32036a5ac5501a5,
title = "Endogenous two-sided markets with repeated transactions",
abstract = "We consider homogeneous two-sided markets, in which connected buyer-seller pairs bargain and trade repeatedly. In this infinite market game with exogenous matching probabilities and a common discount factor, we prove the existence of equilibria in stationary strategies. The equilibrium payoffs are given implicitly as a solution to a system of linear equations. Then, we endogenize the matching mechanism in a link formation stage that precedes the market game. When agents are sufficiently patient and link costs are low, we provide an algorithm to construct minimally connected networks that are pairwise stable with respect to the expected payoffs in the trading stage. The constructed networks are essentially efficient and consist of components with a constant buyer-seller ratio. The latter ratio increases (decreases) for a buyer (seller) that deletes one of her links in a pairwise stable component. Copyright {\textcopyright} 2010 The Berkeley Electronic Press. All rights reserved.",
keywords = "Decentralized trading, Endogenous network formation, Market structure, Two-sided markets",
author = "A. Polanski and E. Winter",
year = "2010",
doi = "10.2202/1935-1704.1632",
language = "English",
volume = "10",
journal = "B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics",
issn = "1935-1704",
publisher = "Berkeley Electronic Press",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Endogenous two-sided markets with repeated transactions

AU - Polanski, A.

AU - Winter, E.

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - We consider homogeneous two-sided markets, in which connected buyer-seller pairs bargain and trade repeatedly. In this infinite market game with exogenous matching probabilities and a common discount factor, we prove the existence of equilibria in stationary strategies. The equilibrium payoffs are given implicitly as a solution to a system of linear equations. Then, we endogenize the matching mechanism in a link formation stage that precedes the market game. When agents are sufficiently patient and link costs are low, we provide an algorithm to construct minimally connected networks that are pairwise stable with respect to the expected payoffs in the trading stage. The constructed networks are essentially efficient and consist of components with a constant buyer-seller ratio. The latter ratio increases (decreases) for a buyer (seller) that deletes one of her links in a pairwise stable component. Copyright © 2010 The Berkeley Electronic Press. All rights reserved.

AB - We consider homogeneous two-sided markets, in which connected buyer-seller pairs bargain and trade repeatedly. In this infinite market game with exogenous matching probabilities and a common discount factor, we prove the existence of equilibria in stationary strategies. The equilibrium payoffs are given implicitly as a solution to a system of linear equations. Then, we endogenize the matching mechanism in a link formation stage that precedes the market game. When agents are sufficiently patient and link costs are low, we provide an algorithm to construct minimally connected networks that are pairwise stable with respect to the expected payoffs in the trading stage. The constructed networks are essentially efficient and consist of components with a constant buyer-seller ratio. The latter ratio increases (decreases) for a buyer (seller) that deletes one of her links in a pairwise stable component. Copyright © 2010 The Berkeley Electronic Press. All rights reserved.

KW - Decentralized trading

KW - Endogenous network formation

KW - Market structure

KW - Two-sided markets

U2 - 10.2202/1935-1704.1632

DO - 10.2202/1935-1704.1632

M3 - Journal article

VL - 10

JO - B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

JF - B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

SN - 1935-1704

IS - 1

ER -