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Ensemble Prospectism

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Ensemble Prospectism. / Kaivanto, Kim Kaleva.
Lancaster: Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 2016. (Economics Working Paper Series).

Research output: Working paper

Harvard

Kaivanto, KK 2016 'Ensemble Prospectism' Economics Working Paper Series, Lancaster University, Department of Economics, Lancaster.

APA

Kaivanto, K. K. (2016). Ensemble Prospectism. (Economics Working Paper Series). Lancaster University, Department of Economics.

Vancouver

Kaivanto KK. Ensemble Prospectism. Lancaster: Lancaster University, Department of Economics. 2016 Dec. (Economics Working Paper Series).

Author

Kaivanto, Kim Kaleva. / Ensemble Prospectism. Lancaster : Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 2016. (Economics Working Paper Series).

Bibtex

@techreport{ac00faade603415aa2aecd9629d1f1ad,
title = "Ensemble Prospectism",
abstract = "Incomplete preferences displaying {\textquoteleft}mildly sweetened{\textquoteright} structure are common, yet theoretically problematic. This paper examines the properties of the rankings induced by the set of all coherent completions of the mildly sweetened partial preference structure. Building on these properties, I propose an ensemble-based refinement of Hare{\textquoteright}s (Analysis 70:237–247, 2010) prospectism criterion for rational choice when preferences are incomplete. Importantly, this ensemble-based refinement is immune to Peterson{\textquoteright}s (Theory & Decision 78:451–456, 2015) weak money pump argument. Hence, ensemble prospectism ensures outcome rationality. Furthermore, by recognizing the structural isomorphism between mildly sweetened preference structures and Cover{\textquoteright}s splitting rule in Blackwell{\textquoteright}s Pick the Largest Number problem (Ann Math Stat 22:393–399, 1951), ensemble prospectism can be shown to yield better-than-even odds of selecting the expost higher-utility option – despite the absence of all-things-considered preferences ex ante.",
keywords = "Prospectism, Refinement, Money pump, Outcome rationality, Ensemble method, Voting rules, Incomplete preferences, Mildly sweetened preferences, Cover rule, Hare, Peterson",
author = "Kaivanto, {Kim Kaleva}",
year = "2016",
month = dec,
language = "English",
series = "Economics Working Paper Series",
publisher = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Ensemble Prospectism

AU - Kaivanto, Kim Kaleva

PY - 2016/12

Y1 - 2016/12

N2 - Incomplete preferences displaying ‘mildly sweetened’ structure are common, yet theoretically problematic. This paper examines the properties of the rankings induced by the set of all coherent completions of the mildly sweetened partial preference structure. Building on these properties, I propose an ensemble-based refinement of Hare’s (Analysis 70:237–247, 2010) prospectism criterion for rational choice when preferences are incomplete. Importantly, this ensemble-based refinement is immune to Peterson’s (Theory & Decision 78:451–456, 2015) weak money pump argument. Hence, ensemble prospectism ensures outcome rationality. Furthermore, by recognizing the structural isomorphism between mildly sweetened preference structures and Cover’s splitting rule in Blackwell’s Pick the Largest Number problem (Ann Math Stat 22:393–399, 1951), ensemble prospectism can be shown to yield better-than-even odds of selecting the expost higher-utility option – despite the absence of all-things-considered preferences ex ante.

AB - Incomplete preferences displaying ‘mildly sweetened’ structure are common, yet theoretically problematic. This paper examines the properties of the rankings induced by the set of all coherent completions of the mildly sweetened partial preference structure. Building on these properties, I propose an ensemble-based refinement of Hare’s (Analysis 70:237–247, 2010) prospectism criterion for rational choice when preferences are incomplete. Importantly, this ensemble-based refinement is immune to Peterson’s (Theory & Decision 78:451–456, 2015) weak money pump argument. Hence, ensemble prospectism ensures outcome rationality. Furthermore, by recognizing the structural isomorphism between mildly sweetened preference structures and Cover’s splitting rule in Blackwell’s Pick the Largest Number problem (Ann Math Stat 22:393–399, 1951), ensemble prospectism can be shown to yield better-than-even odds of selecting the expost higher-utility option – despite the absence of all-things-considered preferences ex ante.

KW - Prospectism

KW - Refinement

KW - Money pump

KW - Outcome rationality

KW - Ensemble method

KW - Voting rules

KW - Incomplete preferences

KW - Mildly sweetened preferences

KW - Cover rule

KW - Hare

KW - Peterson

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Economics Working Paper Series

BT - Ensemble Prospectism

PB - Lancaster University, Department of Economics

CY - Lancaster

ER -