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Executive board composition and bank risk taking

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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Executive board composition and bank risk taking. / Berger, Allen N.; Kick, Thomas; Schaeck, Klaus.
In: Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 28, 01.10.2014, p. 48-65.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Berger, AN, Kick, T & Schaeck, K 2014, 'Executive board composition and bank risk taking', Journal of Corporate Finance, vol. 28, pp. 48-65. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.11.006

APA

Berger, A. N., Kick, T., & Schaeck, K. (2014). Executive board composition and bank risk taking. Journal of Corporate Finance, 28, 48-65. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.11.006

Vancouver

Berger AN, Kick T, Schaeck K. Executive board composition and bank risk taking. Journal of Corporate Finance. 2014 Oct 1;28:48-65. Epub 2013 Nov 13. doi: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.11.006

Author

Berger, Allen N. ; Kick, Thomas ; Schaeck, Klaus. / Executive board composition and bank risk taking. In: Journal of Corporate Finance. 2014 ; Vol. 28. pp. 48-65.

Bibtex

@article{3f21c7566e27462ba42387ec4f063731,
title = "Executive board composition and bank risk taking",
abstract = "Little is known about how the demographic characteristics of executive teams affect corporate governance in banking. Exploiting a unique dataset, we investigate how age, gender, and educational composition of executive teams affect the portfolio risk of financial institutions. Using difference-in-difference estimations that focus exclusively on mandatory executive retirements for the entire population of German bank executive officers, we demonstrate that younger executive teams increase portfolio risk, as do board changes that result in a higher proportion of female executives, although this latter effect is weaker in terms of both statistical and economic significance. In contrast, when board changes increase the representation of executives holding Ph.D. degrees, portfolio risk declines.",
keywords = "banks, executives, porfolio risk, age, gender, education",
author = "Berger, {Allen N.} and Thomas Kick and Klaus Schaeck",
year = "2014",
month = oct,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.11.006",
language = "English",
volume = "28",
pages = "48--65",
journal = "Journal of Corporate Finance",
issn = "0929-1199",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Executive board composition and bank risk taking

AU - Berger, Allen N.

AU - Kick, Thomas

AU - Schaeck, Klaus

PY - 2014/10/1

Y1 - 2014/10/1

N2 - Little is known about how the demographic characteristics of executive teams affect corporate governance in banking. Exploiting a unique dataset, we investigate how age, gender, and educational composition of executive teams affect the portfolio risk of financial institutions. Using difference-in-difference estimations that focus exclusively on mandatory executive retirements for the entire population of German bank executive officers, we demonstrate that younger executive teams increase portfolio risk, as do board changes that result in a higher proportion of female executives, although this latter effect is weaker in terms of both statistical and economic significance. In contrast, when board changes increase the representation of executives holding Ph.D. degrees, portfolio risk declines.

AB - Little is known about how the demographic characteristics of executive teams affect corporate governance in banking. Exploiting a unique dataset, we investigate how age, gender, and educational composition of executive teams affect the portfolio risk of financial institutions. Using difference-in-difference estimations that focus exclusively on mandatory executive retirements for the entire population of German bank executive officers, we demonstrate that younger executive teams increase portfolio risk, as do board changes that result in a higher proportion of female executives, although this latter effect is weaker in terms of both statistical and economic significance. In contrast, when board changes increase the representation of executives holding Ph.D. degrees, portfolio risk declines.

KW - banks

KW - executives

KW - porfolio risk

KW - age

KW - gender

KW - education

U2 - 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.11.006

DO - 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.11.006

M3 - Journal article

VL - 28

SP - 48

EP - 65

JO - Journal of Corporate Finance

JF - Journal of Corporate Finance

SN - 0929-1199

ER -