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Explaining in conversation: towards an argument model.

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Explaining in conversation: towards an argument model. / Antaki, C.; Leudar, I.

In: European Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1992, p. 181-194.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Antaki, C & Leudar, I 1992, 'Explaining in conversation: towards an argument model.', European Journal of Social Psychology, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 181-194. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420220206

APA

Antaki, C., & Leudar, I. (1992). Explaining in conversation: towards an argument model. European Journal of Social Psychology, 22(2), 181-194. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420220206

Vancouver

Antaki C, Leudar I. Explaining in conversation: towards an argument model. European Journal of Social Psychology. 1992;22(2):181-194. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.2420220206

Author

Antaki, C. ; Leudar, I. / Explaining in conversation: towards an argument model. In: European Journal of Social Psychology. 1992 ; Vol. 22, No. 2. pp. 181-194.

Bibtex

@article{94a541973d0043be9719a85980591b5d,
title = "Explaining in conversation: towards an argument model.",
abstract = "We examine the proposition that, in ordinary conversation, people are concerned to argue - to justify their claims and to counter potential and actual counter claims. We test out the proposition by analysing explanations in one particular conversation. We attend to the validity claims of what the speakers say, and to the authority with which they say it. Viewed in that light, we find that the majority of what might look like causal attributions turn out to look like argumentative claim-backings. We then go on to flesh out the quasi-pragmatic rules which might help to decide formally whether any given utterance is be er understood as an argument or a causal explanation. These rules revolve around the speaker's apparent intention and the projected relationship between the clauses in what she or he says. All of this takes us a fair way from attribution theory's model of explanation as the reporting of a cause, and we end up with an argumentative model of ordinary explanation.",
author = "C. Antaki and I. Leudar",
year = "1992",
doi = "10.1002/ejsp.2420220206",
language = "English",
volume = "22",
pages = "181--194",
journal = "European Journal of Social Psychology",
issn = "0046-2772",
publisher = "John Wiley and Sons Ltd",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Explaining in conversation: towards an argument model.

AU - Antaki, C.

AU - Leudar, I.

PY - 1992

Y1 - 1992

N2 - We examine the proposition that, in ordinary conversation, people are concerned to argue - to justify their claims and to counter potential and actual counter claims. We test out the proposition by analysing explanations in one particular conversation. We attend to the validity claims of what the speakers say, and to the authority with which they say it. Viewed in that light, we find that the majority of what might look like causal attributions turn out to look like argumentative claim-backings. We then go on to flesh out the quasi-pragmatic rules which might help to decide formally whether any given utterance is be er understood as an argument or a causal explanation. These rules revolve around the speaker's apparent intention and the projected relationship between the clauses in what she or he says. All of this takes us a fair way from attribution theory's model of explanation as the reporting of a cause, and we end up with an argumentative model of ordinary explanation.

AB - We examine the proposition that, in ordinary conversation, people are concerned to argue - to justify their claims and to counter potential and actual counter claims. We test out the proposition by analysing explanations in one particular conversation. We attend to the validity claims of what the speakers say, and to the authority with which they say it. Viewed in that light, we find that the majority of what might look like causal attributions turn out to look like argumentative claim-backings. We then go on to flesh out the quasi-pragmatic rules which might help to decide formally whether any given utterance is be er understood as an argument or a causal explanation. These rules revolve around the speaker's apparent intention and the projected relationship between the clauses in what she or he says. All of this takes us a fair way from attribution theory's model of explanation as the reporting of a cause, and we end up with an argumentative model of ordinary explanation.

U2 - 10.1002/ejsp.2420220206

DO - 10.1002/ejsp.2420220206

M3 - Journal article

VL - 22

SP - 181

EP - 194

JO - European Journal of Social Psychology

JF - European Journal of Social Psychology

SN - 0046-2772

IS - 2

ER -