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  • https://doi.org/10.3982/te5068

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Exploiting social influence in networks

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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Exploiting social influence in networks. / Nora, Vladyslav; Winter, Eyal.
In: Theoretical Economics, Vol. 19, No. 1, 31.01.2024, p. 1-27.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Nora, V & Winter, E 2024, 'Exploiting social influence in networks', Theoretical Economics, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 1-27. https://doi.org/10.3982/te5068

APA

Nora, V., & Winter, E. (2024). Exploiting social influence in networks. Theoretical Economics, 19(1), 1-27. https://doi.org/10.3982/te5068

Vancouver

Nora V, Winter E. Exploiting social influence in networks. Theoretical Economics. 2024 Jan 31;19(1):1-27. doi: 10.3982/te5068

Author

Nora, Vladyslav ; Winter, Eyal. / Exploiting social influence in networks. In: Theoretical Economics. 2024 ; Vol. 19, No. 1. pp. 1-27.

Bibtex

@article{be4ed0dd4e164b52ac9e2f1b33c953ad,
title = "Exploiting social influence in networks",
abstract = "We study binary action network games with strategic complementarities. An agent acts if the aggregate social influence of her friends exceeds a transfer levied on the agent by a principal. The principal seeks to maximize her revenue while inducing everyone to act in a unique equilibrium. We characterize optimal transfers showing that agents who are more popular than their friends receive preferential treatment. Our main result is that under mild conditions complete core‐periphery networks deliver the highest revenue to the principal. Furthermore, we show that the revenue is higher in networks where links are allocated unequally across agents. Hence, the principal benefits from creating “influentials” by linking well‐connected hubs to less popular periphery.",
keywords = "strategic complementarities, unique implementation, D82, C72, split graphs, Social networks",
author = "Vladyslav Nora and Eyal Winter",
year = "2024",
month = jan,
day = "31",
doi = "10.3982/te5068",
language = "English",
volume = "19",
pages = "1--27",
journal = "Theoretical Economics",
issn = "1933-6837",
publisher = "Econometric Society",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Exploiting social influence in networks

AU - Nora, Vladyslav

AU - Winter, Eyal

PY - 2024/1/31

Y1 - 2024/1/31

N2 - We study binary action network games with strategic complementarities. An agent acts if the aggregate social influence of her friends exceeds a transfer levied on the agent by a principal. The principal seeks to maximize her revenue while inducing everyone to act in a unique equilibrium. We characterize optimal transfers showing that agents who are more popular than their friends receive preferential treatment. Our main result is that under mild conditions complete core‐periphery networks deliver the highest revenue to the principal. Furthermore, we show that the revenue is higher in networks where links are allocated unequally across agents. Hence, the principal benefits from creating “influentials” by linking well‐connected hubs to less popular periphery.

AB - We study binary action network games with strategic complementarities. An agent acts if the aggregate social influence of her friends exceeds a transfer levied on the agent by a principal. The principal seeks to maximize her revenue while inducing everyone to act in a unique equilibrium. We characterize optimal transfers showing that agents who are more popular than their friends receive preferential treatment. Our main result is that under mild conditions complete core‐periphery networks deliver the highest revenue to the principal. Furthermore, we show that the revenue is higher in networks where links are allocated unequally across agents. Hence, the principal benefits from creating “influentials” by linking well‐connected hubs to less popular periphery.

KW - strategic complementarities

KW - unique implementation

KW - D82

KW - C72

KW - split graphs

KW - Social networks

U2 - 10.3982/te5068

DO - 10.3982/te5068

M3 - Journal article

VL - 19

SP - 1

EP - 27

JO - Theoretical Economics

JF - Theoretical Economics

SN - 1933-6837

IS - 1

ER -