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Fact, Value, and Disorder

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSNChapter (peer-reviewed)peer-review

Forthcoming

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Fact, Value, and Disorder. / Cooper, Rachel.
Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Medicine. ed. / Alex Broadbent. Oxford: Oxford University Press (OUP), 2024.

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSNChapter (peer-reviewed)peer-review

Harvard

Cooper, R 2024, Fact, Value, and Disorder. in A Broadbent (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Medicine. Oxford University Press (OUP), Oxford.

APA

Cooper, R. (in press). Fact, Value, and Disorder. In A. Broadbent (Ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Medicine Oxford University Press (OUP).

Vancouver

Cooper R. Fact, Value, and Disorder. In Broadbent A, editor, Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Medicine. Oxford: Oxford University Press (OUP). 2024

Author

Cooper, Rachel. / Fact, Value, and Disorder. Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Medicine. editor / Alex Broadbent. Oxford : Oxford University Press (OUP), 2024.

Bibtex

@inbook{acd014f2793b4d3396405a8f55974e75,
title = "Fact, Value, and Disorder",
abstract = "Philosophers of medicine have long sought to understand the distinction between the normal and the pathological, and have proposed a number of different accounts of “disorder.” Christopher Boorse has argued that disorder is fundamentally a factual concept, belonging to the biological sciences. Normativists disagree, and see disorder as a value-laden concept, connected to notions of “the good life.” All accounts of disorder developed to date run into difficulties, and there is a sense that the philosophical project that aims to describe our current concept of disorder has become bogged down. A number of authors have now given up trying to describe our current concept of disorder and have instead moved to revisionary projects of conceptual engineering. Eliminativists argue that we would do best to eliminate the concept of disorder, while more optimistic revisionists have proposals for new concept(s) of disorder that might better advance scientific or social progress. ",
author = "Rachel Cooper",
year = "2024",
month = apr,
day = "2",
language = "English",
editor = "Alex Broadbent",
booktitle = "Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Medicine",
publisher = "Oxford University Press (OUP)",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Fact, Value, and Disorder

AU - Cooper, Rachel

PY - 2024/4/2

Y1 - 2024/4/2

N2 - Philosophers of medicine have long sought to understand the distinction between the normal and the pathological, and have proposed a number of different accounts of “disorder.” Christopher Boorse has argued that disorder is fundamentally a factual concept, belonging to the biological sciences. Normativists disagree, and see disorder as a value-laden concept, connected to notions of “the good life.” All accounts of disorder developed to date run into difficulties, and there is a sense that the philosophical project that aims to describe our current concept of disorder has become bogged down. A number of authors have now given up trying to describe our current concept of disorder and have instead moved to revisionary projects of conceptual engineering. Eliminativists argue that we would do best to eliminate the concept of disorder, while more optimistic revisionists have proposals for new concept(s) of disorder that might better advance scientific or social progress.

AB - Philosophers of medicine have long sought to understand the distinction between the normal and the pathological, and have proposed a number of different accounts of “disorder.” Christopher Boorse has argued that disorder is fundamentally a factual concept, belonging to the biological sciences. Normativists disagree, and see disorder as a value-laden concept, connected to notions of “the good life.” All accounts of disorder developed to date run into difficulties, and there is a sense that the philosophical project that aims to describe our current concept of disorder has become bogged down. A number of authors have now given up trying to describe our current concept of disorder and have instead moved to revisionary projects of conceptual engineering. Eliminativists argue that we would do best to eliminate the concept of disorder, while more optimistic revisionists have proposals for new concept(s) of disorder that might better advance scientific or social progress.

M3 - Chapter (peer-reviewed)

BT - Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Medicine

A2 - Broadbent, Alex

PB - Oxford University Press (OUP)

CY - Oxford

ER -