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Fast and Furious: Outrunning Windows Kernel Notification Routines from User-Mode

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Fast and Furious: Outrunning Windows Kernel Notification Routines from User-Mode. / Ciholas, Pierre; Such, Jose; Marnerides, Angelos et al.
Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment. DIMVA 2020. . Springer, 2020. p. 67-88.

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSNConference contribution/Paperpeer-review

Harvard

Ciholas, P, Such, J, Marnerides, A, Green, B, Zhang, J & Roedig, U 2020, Fast and Furious: Outrunning Windows Kernel Notification Routines from User-Mode. in Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment. DIMVA 2020. . Springer, pp. 67-88, The 17th Conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware & Vulnerability Assessment, Lisbon, Portugal, 24/06/20. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52683-2_4

APA

Ciholas, P., Such, J., Marnerides, A., Green, B., Zhang, J., & Roedig, U. (2020). Fast and Furious: Outrunning Windows Kernel Notification Routines from User-Mode. In Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment. DIMVA 2020.  (pp. 67-88). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52683-2_4

Vancouver

Ciholas P, Such J, Marnerides A, Green B, Zhang J, Roedig U. Fast and Furious: Outrunning Windows Kernel Notification Routines from User-Mode. In Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment. DIMVA 2020. . Springer. 2020. p. 67-88 doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-52683-2_4

Author

Ciholas, Pierre ; Such, Jose ; Marnerides, Angelos et al. / Fast and Furious : Outrunning Windows Kernel Notification Routines from User-Mode. Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment. DIMVA 2020. . Springer, 2020. pp. 67-88

Bibtex

@inproceedings{a78e22db18554662bc28847541bbd988,
title = "Fast and Furious: Outrunning Windows Kernel Notification Routines from User-Mode",
abstract = "Modern Operating Systems (OSs) enable user processes to obtain full access control over other processes initiated by the same user. In scenarios of sensitive security processes (e.g., antivirus software), protection schemes are enforced at the kernel level such as to confront arbitrary user processes overtaking with malicious intent. Within the Windows family of OSs, the kernel driver is notified via dedicated routines for user-mode processes that require protection. In such cases the kernel driver establishes a callback mechanism triggered whenever a handle request for the original user-mode process is initiated by a different user process. Subsequently, the kernel driver performs a selective permission removal process (e.g., read access to the process memory) prior to passing a handle to the requesting process. In this paper we are the first to demonstrate a fundamental user-mode process access control vulnerability, existing in Windows 7 up to the most recent Windows 10 OSs. We show that a user-mode process can indeed obtain a fully privileged access handlebe forethe kernel driver is notified, thus prior to the callback mechanism establishment. Our study shows that this flaw can be exploited by a method to (i) disable the antimalware suite Symantec Endpoint Protection; (ii) overtake VirtualBox protected processes; (iii) circumvent two major video game anti-cheat protection solutions, BattlEye and EasyAntiCheat. Finally we provide recommendations on how to address the discovered vulnerability.",
keywords = "vulnerability, operating systems, windows, kernal, malware",
author = "Pierre Ciholas and Jose Such and Angelos Marnerides and Benjamin Green and Jiajie Zhang and Utz Roedig",
note = "The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/[insert DOI] ; The 17th Conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware & Vulnerability Assessment, DIMVA 2020 ; Conference date: 24-06-2020 Through 26-06-2020",
year = "2020",
month = jul,
day = "7",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-030-52683-2_4",
language = "English",
isbn = "9783030526825",
pages = "67--88",
booktitle = "Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment. DIMVA 2020. ",
publisher = "Springer",

}

RIS

TY - GEN

T1 - Fast and Furious

T2 - The 17th Conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware & Vulnerability Assessment

AU - Ciholas, Pierre

AU - Such, Jose

AU - Marnerides, Angelos

AU - Green, Benjamin

AU - Zhang, Jiajie

AU - Roedig, Utz

N1 - The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/[insert DOI]

PY - 2020/7/7

Y1 - 2020/7/7

N2 - Modern Operating Systems (OSs) enable user processes to obtain full access control over other processes initiated by the same user. In scenarios of sensitive security processes (e.g., antivirus software), protection schemes are enforced at the kernel level such as to confront arbitrary user processes overtaking with malicious intent. Within the Windows family of OSs, the kernel driver is notified via dedicated routines for user-mode processes that require protection. In such cases the kernel driver establishes a callback mechanism triggered whenever a handle request for the original user-mode process is initiated by a different user process. Subsequently, the kernel driver performs a selective permission removal process (e.g., read access to the process memory) prior to passing a handle to the requesting process. In this paper we are the first to demonstrate a fundamental user-mode process access control vulnerability, existing in Windows 7 up to the most recent Windows 10 OSs. We show that a user-mode process can indeed obtain a fully privileged access handlebe forethe kernel driver is notified, thus prior to the callback mechanism establishment. Our study shows that this flaw can be exploited by a method to (i) disable the antimalware suite Symantec Endpoint Protection; (ii) overtake VirtualBox protected processes; (iii) circumvent two major video game anti-cheat protection solutions, BattlEye and EasyAntiCheat. Finally we provide recommendations on how to address the discovered vulnerability.

AB - Modern Operating Systems (OSs) enable user processes to obtain full access control over other processes initiated by the same user. In scenarios of sensitive security processes (e.g., antivirus software), protection schemes are enforced at the kernel level such as to confront arbitrary user processes overtaking with malicious intent. Within the Windows family of OSs, the kernel driver is notified via dedicated routines for user-mode processes that require protection. In such cases the kernel driver establishes a callback mechanism triggered whenever a handle request for the original user-mode process is initiated by a different user process. Subsequently, the kernel driver performs a selective permission removal process (e.g., read access to the process memory) prior to passing a handle to the requesting process. In this paper we are the first to demonstrate a fundamental user-mode process access control vulnerability, existing in Windows 7 up to the most recent Windows 10 OSs. We show that a user-mode process can indeed obtain a fully privileged access handlebe forethe kernel driver is notified, thus prior to the callback mechanism establishment. Our study shows that this flaw can be exploited by a method to (i) disable the antimalware suite Symantec Endpoint Protection; (ii) overtake VirtualBox protected processes; (iii) circumvent two major video game anti-cheat protection solutions, BattlEye and EasyAntiCheat. Finally we provide recommendations on how to address the discovered vulnerability.

KW - vulnerability

KW - operating systems

KW - windows

KW - kernal

KW - malware

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-52683-2_4

DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-52683-2_4

M3 - Conference contribution/Paper

SN - 9783030526825

SP - 67

EP - 88

BT - Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment. DIMVA 2020. 

PB - Springer

Y2 - 24 June 2020 through 26 June 2020

ER -