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Fast-track authority and international trade negotiations

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Fast-track authority and international trade negotiations. / Conconi, Paola; Facchini, Giovanni; Zanardi, Maurizio.
In: American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2012, p. 146-189.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Conconi, P, Facchini, G & Zanardi, M 2012, 'Fast-track authority and international trade negotiations', American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 146-189. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.4.3.146

APA

Conconi, P., Facchini, G., & Zanardi, M. (2012). Fast-track authority and international trade negotiations. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 4(3), 146-189. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.4.3.146

Vancouver

Conconi P, Facchini G, Zanardi M. Fast-track authority and international trade negotiations. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy. 2012;4(3):146-189. doi: 10.1257/pol.4.3.146

Author

Conconi, Paola ; Facchini, Giovanni ; Zanardi, Maurizio. / Fast-track authority and international trade negotiations. In: American Economic Journal: Economic Policy. 2012 ; Vol. 4, No. 3. pp. 146-189.

Bibtex

@article{494cb91e38134ca59e46190cccd33f4a,
title = "Fast-track authority and international trade negotiations",
abstract = "We develop a simple model of trade relations in which legislators with different stakes in import-competing and export industries decide whether to grant fast-track authority (FTA) to the president, giving up the power to amend international trade agreements. We show that strategic delegation motives are key to understanding FTA votes, which involve a decision between alternative country representatives: the executive or the majority in Congress. We then examine the determinants of all votes by US congressmen on FTA since the introduction of this institutional procedure in 1974. Our empirical analysis provides strong support for the predictions of the model.",
author = "Paola Conconi and Giovanni Facchini and Maurizio Zanardi",
note = "Copyright {\textcopyright} 2013 AEA ",
year = "2012",
doi = "10.1257/pol.4.3.146",
language = "English",
volume = "4",
pages = "146--189",
journal = "American Economic Journal: Economic Policy",
issn = "1945-7731",
publisher = "American Economic Association",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Fast-track authority and international trade negotiations

AU - Conconi, Paola

AU - Facchini, Giovanni

AU - Zanardi, Maurizio

N1 - Copyright © 2013 AEA

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

N2 - We develop a simple model of trade relations in which legislators with different stakes in import-competing and export industries decide whether to grant fast-track authority (FTA) to the president, giving up the power to amend international trade agreements. We show that strategic delegation motives are key to understanding FTA votes, which involve a decision between alternative country representatives: the executive or the majority in Congress. We then examine the determinants of all votes by US congressmen on FTA since the introduction of this institutional procedure in 1974. Our empirical analysis provides strong support for the predictions of the model.

AB - We develop a simple model of trade relations in which legislators with different stakes in import-competing and export industries decide whether to grant fast-track authority (FTA) to the president, giving up the power to amend international trade agreements. We show that strategic delegation motives are key to understanding FTA votes, which involve a decision between alternative country representatives: the executive or the majority in Congress. We then examine the determinants of all votes by US congressmen on FTA since the introduction of this institutional procedure in 1974. Our empirical analysis provides strong support for the predictions of the model.

U2 - 10.1257/pol.4.3.146

DO - 10.1257/pol.4.3.146

M3 - Journal article

VL - 4

SP - 146

EP - 189

JO - American Economic Journal: Economic Policy

JF - American Economic Journal: Economic Policy

SN - 1945-7731

IS - 3

ER -