Inspired by an idea that occurred to me during a walking holiday in Scotland, this article identifies a new dimension to place memory: namely, the way in which we can be unexpectedly reminded of one place in another that is, on first inspection, very different. Reflecting on this phenomenon has led me to propose (similar to Hayden Lorimer) that topographical features such as slope, camber and terrain are key to embodied memories and help explain why they are, on occasion, transportable. This thesis then becomes the springboard for a dialogue with the post-phenomenological approaches to landscape developed by John Wylie and others regarding the existential (im) possibility of there being any ‘coincidence’ between ‘self and world’. My counter-argument proceeds via an exploration of different models of memory–in particular, Henri Bergson’s work on déjà-vu–which helps explain our fleeting sensations of familiarity and belonging to particular locations. By this means, the notional indifference of the landscape (as construed by the post-phenomenologists) is emplaced. These conclusions return the discussion to wider debates in cultural geography about what we stand to lose, and exclude, through the move from phenomenological to post-phenomenological frameworks.