Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > Formal versus informal monitoring in teams

Research

Links

Text available via DOI:

View graph of relations

Formal versus informal monitoring in teams

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Published

Standard

Formal versus informal monitoring in teams. / Gershkov, A.; Winter, E.
In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol. 7, No. 2, 05.2015, p. 27-44.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Gershkov, A & Winter, E 2015, 'Formal versus informal monitoring in teams', American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 27-44. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20130277

APA

Gershkov, A., & Winter, E. (2015). Formal versus informal monitoring in teams. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7(2), 27-44. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20130277

Vancouver

Gershkov A, Winter E. Formal versus informal monitoring in teams. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2015 May;7(2):27-44. doi: 10.1257/mic.20130277

Author

Gershkov, A. ; Winter, E. / Formal versus informal monitoring in teams. In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2015 ; Vol. 7, No. 2. pp. 27-44.

Bibtex

@article{84b7e8fca4134cdbb41d749f90bb7638,
title = "Formal versus informal monitoring in teams",
abstract = "In this paper we analyze a principal's optimal monitoring strategies in a team environment. In doing so we study the interaction between formal monitoring and informal ( peer) monitoring. We show that if the technology satisfies complementarity, peer monitoring substitutes for the principal's monitoring. However, if the technology satisfies substitution, the principal's optimal monitoring is independent of the peer monitoring. We also show that if the technology satisfies complementarity, then the principal in the optimal contracts will monitor more closely than in the case of substitution.",
author = "A. Gershkov and E. Winter",
year = "2015",
month = may,
doi = "10.1257/mic.20130277",
language = "English",
volume = "7",
pages = "27--44",
journal = "American Economic Journal: Microeconomics",
issn = "1945-7669",
publisher = "American Economic Association",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Formal versus informal monitoring in teams

AU - Gershkov, A.

AU - Winter, E.

PY - 2015/5

Y1 - 2015/5

N2 - In this paper we analyze a principal's optimal monitoring strategies in a team environment. In doing so we study the interaction between formal monitoring and informal ( peer) monitoring. We show that if the technology satisfies complementarity, peer monitoring substitutes for the principal's monitoring. However, if the technology satisfies substitution, the principal's optimal monitoring is independent of the peer monitoring. We also show that if the technology satisfies complementarity, then the principal in the optimal contracts will monitor more closely than in the case of substitution.

AB - In this paper we analyze a principal's optimal monitoring strategies in a team environment. In doing so we study the interaction between formal monitoring and informal ( peer) monitoring. We show that if the technology satisfies complementarity, peer monitoring substitutes for the principal's monitoring. However, if the technology satisfies substitution, the principal's optimal monitoring is independent of the peer monitoring. We also show that if the technology satisfies complementarity, then the principal in the optimal contracts will monitor more closely than in the case of substitution.

U2 - 10.1257/mic.20130277

DO - 10.1257/mic.20130277

M3 - Journal article

VL - 7

SP - 27

EP - 44

JO - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

JF - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

SN - 1945-7669

IS - 2

ER -