Since the late 1990s, French policymakers have promised an indirect approach to African security in partnership with regional organisations. Yet this shift towards capacity-building, Africanization and multilateralization has not necessarily been followed, and forceful French military interventions in Africa have still taken place. This article thus aims to assess whether, to what extent, and why the theoretical convergence of France’s African security policy and the peacekeeping aspirations of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) does not necessarily translate into practice. Through the analysis of the evolution of France’s African security policy and ECOWAS’ peacekeeping record, the French capacity-building efforts in West Africa, and the roles of France and ECOWAS in the Ivorian and Malian crises, this article will show that convergence in practice depends on the nature of an individual crisis, as well as the political, strategic, and economic interests of both France and ECOWAS member states.