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Futures for farmers: hedging participation and the Mexican corn scheme

Research output: Working paper

Published

Standard

Futures for farmers: hedging participation and the Mexican corn scheme. / Benavides, G; Snowden, P N.
Lancaster University: The Department of Economics, 2005. (Economics Working Paper Series).

Research output: Working paper

Harvard

Benavides, G & Snowden, PN 2005 'Futures for farmers: hedging participation and the Mexican corn scheme' Economics Working Paper Series, The Department of Economics, Lancaster University.

APA

Benavides, G., & Snowden, P. N. (2005). Futures for farmers: hedging participation and the Mexican corn scheme. (Economics Working Paper Series). The Department of Economics.

Vancouver

Benavides G, Snowden PN. Futures for farmers: hedging participation and the Mexican corn scheme. Lancaster University: The Department of Economics. 2005. (Economics Working Paper Series).

Author

Benavides, G ; Snowden, P N. / Futures for farmers: hedging participation and the Mexican corn scheme. Lancaster University : The Department of Economics, 2005. (Economics Working Paper Series).

Bibtex

@techreport{102e31a73e8e459ea3c68d01563f603c,
title = "Futures for farmers: hedging participation and the Mexican corn scheme",
abstract = "Administered commodity price schemes in developing countries have proved ineffective in raising farmers{\textquoteright} incomes and price stabilisation through futures markets is increasingly advocated as the alternative policy objective. A potential difficulty is that farmers tend not to hedge extensively, even in developed countries where access to futures markets is long established. Explanations for this reticence are examined here with context provided by the Mexican hedging programme, which incorporates financial incentives to spur adoption. Applying representative data for corn to a well-known analysis of the hedging decision suggests that limited participation may reflect rational calculation rather than farmer {\textquoteleft}inertia{\textquoteright}. A policy implication is that permanent access subsidies are difficult to justify from the national perspective.",
keywords = "farmers, hedging incentives, subsidies, Mexico",
author = "G Benavides and Snowden, {P N}",
year = "2005",
language = "English",
series = "Economics Working Paper Series",
publisher = "The Department of Economics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "The Department of Economics",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Futures for farmers: hedging participation and the Mexican corn scheme

AU - Benavides, G

AU - Snowden, P N

PY - 2005

Y1 - 2005

N2 - Administered commodity price schemes in developing countries have proved ineffective in raising farmers’ incomes and price stabilisation through futures markets is increasingly advocated as the alternative policy objective. A potential difficulty is that farmers tend not to hedge extensively, even in developed countries where access to futures markets is long established. Explanations for this reticence are examined here with context provided by the Mexican hedging programme, which incorporates financial incentives to spur adoption. Applying representative data for corn to a well-known analysis of the hedging decision suggests that limited participation may reflect rational calculation rather than farmer ‘inertia’. A policy implication is that permanent access subsidies are difficult to justify from the national perspective.

AB - Administered commodity price schemes in developing countries have proved ineffective in raising farmers’ incomes and price stabilisation through futures markets is increasingly advocated as the alternative policy objective. A potential difficulty is that farmers tend not to hedge extensively, even in developed countries where access to futures markets is long established. Explanations for this reticence are examined here with context provided by the Mexican hedging programme, which incorporates financial incentives to spur adoption. Applying representative data for corn to a well-known analysis of the hedging decision suggests that limited participation may reflect rational calculation rather than farmer ‘inertia’. A policy implication is that permanent access subsidies are difficult to justify from the national perspective.

KW - farmers

KW - hedging incentives

KW - subsidies

KW - Mexico

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Economics Working Paper Series

BT - Futures for farmers: hedging participation and the Mexican corn scheme

PB - The Department of Economics

CY - Lancaster University

ER -