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Gate-sharing and talent distribution in the English Football League

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

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Gate-sharing and talent distribution in the English Football League. / Robinson, Terry; Simmons, Robert.
In: International Journal of the Economics of Business, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2014, p. 413-429.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Robinson, T & Simmons, R 2014, 'Gate-sharing and talent distribution in the English Football League', International Journal of the Economics of Business, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 413-429. https://doi.org/10.1080/13571516.2014.947705

APA

Robinson, T., & Simmons, R. (2014). Gate-sharing and talent distribution in the English Football League. International Journal of the Economics of Business, 21(3), 413-429. https://doi.org/10.1080/13571516.2014.947705

Vancouver

Robinson T, Simmons R. Gate-sharing and talent distribution in the English Football League. International Journal of the Economics of Business. 2014;21(3):413-429. Epub 2014 Aug 28. doi: 10.1080/13571516.2014.947705

Author

Robinson, Terry ; Simmons, Robert. / Gate-sharing and talent distribution in the English Football League. In: International Journal of the Economics of Business. 2014 ; Vol. 21, No. 3. pp. 413-429.

Bibtex

@article{5de2556cf6de40c1a40919f88966084a,
title = "Gate-sharing and talent distribution in the English Football League",
abstract = "Using a database of the movements of more than 2,000 professional footballers in the top two divisions of the English Football League between 1969 and 1995, this article examines the impact on talent distribution via the movement of players after abolition of gate revenue sharing in 1983. We compare the results with the predictions of the Walrasian and Nash theoretical models presented in the sports economics literature. Our key finding is that the termination of gate revenue sharing brought about increased rates of transfers of quality players towards top division teams. We also find that there is an increased probability that better quality players will be transferred within divisions to bigger teams. These results go against one of the main theoretical predictions of the sports economics literature – that gate sharing will have no effect on competitive balance. Instead, they offer support for models based on win maximisation rather than profit maximisation.",
keywords = "Revenue Sharing, Player Mobility, Football, Competitive Balance, L83",
author = "Terry Robinson and Robert Simmons",
year = "2014",
doi = "10.1080/13571516.2014.947705",
language = "English",
volume = "21",
pages = "413--429",
journal = "International Journal of the Economics of Business",
issn = "1357-1516",
publisher = "Routledge",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Gate-sharing and talent distribution in the English Football League

AU - Robinson, Terry

AU - Simmons, Robert

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - Using a database of the movements of more than 2,000 professional footballers in the top two divisions of the English Football League between 1969 and 1995, this article examines the impact on talent distribution via the movement of players after abolition of gate revenue sharing in 1983. We compare the results with the predictions of the Walrasian and Nash theoretical models presented in the sports economics literature. Our key finding is that the termination of gate revenue sharing brought about increased rates of transfers of quality players towards top division teams. We also find that there is an increased probability that better quality players will be transferred within divisions to bigger teams. These results go against one of the main theoretical predictions of the sports economics literature – that gate sharing will have no effect on competitive balance. Instead, they offer support for models based on win maximisation rather than profit maximisation.

AB - Using a database of the movements of more than 2,000 professional footballers in the top two divisions of the English Football League between 1969 and 1995, this article examines the impact on talent distribution via the movement of players after abolition of gate revenue sharing in 1983. We compare the results with the predictions of the Walrasian and Nash theoretical models presented in the sports economics literature. Our key finding is that the termination of gate revenue sharing brought about increased rates of transfers of quality players towards top division teams. We also find that there is an increased probability that better quality players will be transferred within divisions to bigger teams. These results go against one of the main theoretical predictions of the sports economics literature – that gate sharing will have no effect on competitive balance. Instead, they offer support for models based on win maximisation rather than profit maximisation.

KW - Revenue Sharing

KW - Player Mobility

KW - Football

KW - Competitive Balance

KW - L83

U2 - 10.1080/13571516.2014.947705

DO - 10.1080/13571516.2014.947705

M3 - Journal article

VL - 21

SP - 413

EP - 429

JO - International Journal of the Economics of Business

JF - International Journal of the Economics of Business

SN - 1357-1516

IS - 3

ER -