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Goosewolf: An Embedded Intrusion Detection System for Advanced Programmable Logic Controllers

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

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Goosewolf: An Embedded Intrusion Detection System for Advanced Programmable Logic Controllers. / Allison, David; McLaughlin, Kieran; Smith, Paul.
In: Digital Threats: Research and Practice, Vol. 4, No. 4, 59, 31.12.2023, p. 1-19.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Allison, D, McLaughlin, K & Smith, P 2023, 'Goosewolf: An Embedded Intrusion Detection System for Advanced Programmable Logic Controllers', Digital Threats: Research and Practice, vol. 4, no. 4, 59, pp. 1-19. https://doi.org/10.1145/3617692

APA

Allison, D., McLaughlin, K., & Smith, P. (2023). Goosewolf: An Embedded Intrusion Detection System for Advanced Programmable Logic Controllers. Digital Threats: Research and Practice, 4(4), 1-19. Article 59. https://doi.org/10.1145/3617692

Vancouver

Allison D, McLaughlin K, Smith P. Goosewolf: An Embedded Intrusion Detection System for Advanced Programmable Logic Controllers. Digital Threats: Research and Practice. 2023 Dec 31;4(4):1-19. 59. Epub 2023 Oct 20. doi: 10.1145/3617692

Author

Allison, David ; McLaughlin, Kieran ; Smith, Paul. / Goosewolf : An Embedded Intrusion Detection System for Advanced Programmable Logic Controllers. In: Digital Threats: Research and Practice. 2023 ; Vol. 4, No. 4. pp. 1-19.

Bibtex

@article{f6c8b6a74e9e483bbf1bceb53c14f1c6,
title = "Goosewolf: An Embedded Intrusion Detection System for Advanced Programmable Logic Controllers",
abstract = "Critical infrastructures are making increasing use of digital technology for process control. While there are benefits, such as increased efficiency and new functionality, digitalization also introduces the risk of cyber-attacks to systems that support critical functions. A valuable target in these Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) are the Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) controlling the machinery that manages a physical process. PLCs have proven to be vulnerable to a range of cyber-attacks in the past; however, newer technologies such as embedded servers and virtualization have the potential to improve this situation and be used to monitor a PLC{\textquoteright}s function. In this article, the implementation of a Host-based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) for a modern PLC is described. This method uniquely makes use of native technologies on the PLC to monitor a dynamic simulated process in real time. Both the PLC{\textquoteright}s integrity (checksum, file size, etc.) and the process control are monitored to determine whether the PLC has been compromised in a cyber-attack. The proposed solution detects a range of attacks, even when the PLC{\textquoteright}s control logic is compromised and—unlike previous PLC HIDS methods—requires no modification of the underlying PLC technology.",
keywords = "Runtime verification, Programmable logic controller, Intrusion detection, Industrial control systems",
author = "David Allison and Kieran McLaughlin and Paul Smith",
year = "2023",
month = dec,
day = "31",
doi = "10.1145/3617692",
language = "English",
volume = "4",
pages = "1--19",
journal = "Digital Threats: Research and Practice",
publisher = "ACM",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Goosewolf

T2 - An Embedded Intrusion Detection System for Advanced Programmable Logic Controllers

AU - Allison, David

AU - McLaughlin, Kieran

AU - Smith, Paul

PY - 2023/12/31

Y1 - 2023/12/31

N2 - Critical infrastructures are making increasing use of digital technology for process control. While there are benefits, such as increased efficiency and new functionality, digitalization also introduces the risk of cyber-attacks to systems that support critical functions. A valuable target in these Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) are the Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) controlling the machinery that manages a physical process. PLCs have proven to be vulnerable to a range of cyber-attacks in the past; however, newer technologies such as embedded servers and virtualization have the potential to improve this situation and be used to monitor a PLC’s function. In this article, the implementation of a Host-based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) for a modern PLC is described. This method uniquely makes use of native technologies on the PLC to monitor a dynamic simulated process in real time. Both the PLC’s integrity (checksum, file size, etc.) and the process control are monitored to determine whether the PLC has been compromised in a cyber-attack. The proposed solution detects a range of attacks, even when the PLC’s control logic is compromised and—unlike previous PLC HIDS methods—requires no modification of the underlying PLC technology.

AB - Critical infrastructures are making increasing use of digital technology for process control. While there are benefits, such as increased efficiency and new functionality, digitalization also introduces the risk of cyber-attacks to systems that support critical functions. A valuable target in these Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) are the Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) controlling the machinery that manages a physical process. PLCs have proven to be vulnerable to a range of cyber-attacks in the past; however, newer technologies such as embedded servers and virtualization have the potential to improve this situation and be used to monitor a PLC’s function. In this article, the implementation of a Host-based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) for a modern PLC is described. This method uniquely makes use of native technologies on the PLC to monitor a dynamic simulated process in real time. Both the PLC’s integrity (checksum, file size, etc.) and the process control are monitored to determine whether the PLC has been compromised in a cyber-attack. The proposed solution detects a range of attacks, even when the PLC’s control logic is compromised and—unlike previous PLC HIDS methods—requires no modification of the underlying PLC technology.

KW - Runtime verification

KW - Programmable logic controller

KW - Intrusion detection

KW - Industrial control systems

U2 - 10.1145/3617692

DO - 10.1145/3617692

M3 - Journal article

VL - 4

SP - 1

EP - 19

JO - Digital Threats: Research and Practice

JF - Digital Threats: Research and Practice

IS - 4

M1 - 59

ER -