Rights statement: This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in European Journal of Political Economy. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in European Journal of Political Economy, 68, 2021 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101988
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Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Government response to increased demand for public services
T2 - The cyclicality of government health expenditures in the OECD
AU - Abbott, Andrew
AU - Jones, Philip
N1 - This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in European Journal of Political Economy. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in European Journal of Political Economy, 68, 2021 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101988
PY - 2021/6/3
Y1 - 2021/6/3
N2 - The more that health care expenditures are financed by general taxation, the greater the discretion governments are likely to exercise when timing increases in health care expenditures. Vote-maximising governments time increases in health care expenditures to occur in economic upturns, when voters are not as aware of the required increase in taxation. In recessions, they have an incentive to sustain expenditures on health care by diverting expenditures from other public expenditure programmes that voters perceive as low priority. In this way, government pursuit of a political agenda is likely to exert a systematic influence on the cyclicality of government expenditure. Predictions are tested with reference to the cyclicality of government health expenditures, for a sample of OECD countries from 2000 to 2012.
AB - The more that health care expenditures are financed by general taxation, the greater the discretion governments are likely to exercise when timing increases in health care expenditures. Vote-maximising governments time increases in health care expenditures to occur in economic upturns, when voters are not as aware of the required increase in taxation. In recessions, they have an incentive to sustain expenditures on health care by diverting expenditures from other public expenditure programmes that voters perceive as low priority. In this way, government pursuit of a political agenda is likely to exert a systematic influence on the cyclicality of government expenditure. Predictions are tested with reference to the cyclicality of government health expenditures, for a sample of OECD countries from 2000 to 2012.
KW - Health Care
KW - Business Cycles
KW - Fiscal Illusion
KW - Voracity Effects
U2 - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101988
DO - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101988
M3 - Journal article
VL - 68
JO - European Journal of Political Economy
JF - European Journal of Political Economy
SN - 0176-2680
M1 - 101988
ER -