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Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Group behaviour in tacit coordination games with focal points – an experimental investigation
AU - Sitzia, Stefania
AU - Zheng, Jiwei
PY - 2019/9/1
Y1 - 2019/9/1
N2 - This paper reports an experimental investigation of Schelling's theory of focal points that compares group and individual behaviour. We find that, when players' interests are perfectly aligned, groups more often choose the salient option and achieve higher coordination success than individuals. However, in games with conflicts of interest, groups do not always perform better than individuals, especially when the degree of conflict is substantial. We also find that groups outperform individuals when identifying the solution to the coordination problem requires some level of cognitive sophistication. Finally, players that successfully identify the solution to this game also achieve greater coordination rates than other players in games with a low degree of conflict. This result raises the question of whether finding the focal point is more a matter of logic rather than imagination as Schelling argued.
AB - This paper reports an experimental investigation of Schelling's theory of focal points that compares group and individual behaviour. We find that, when players' interests are perfectly aligned, groups more often choose the salient option and achieve higher coordination success than individuals. However, in games with conflicts of interest, groups do not always perform better than individuals, especially when the degree of conflict is substantial. We also find that groups outperform individuals when identifying the solution to the coordination problem requires some level of cognitive sophistication. Finally, players that successfully identify the solution to this game also achieve greater coordination rates than other players in games with a low degree of conflict. This result raises the question of whether finding the focal point is more a matter of logic rather than imagination as Schelling argued.
KW - Groups
KW - Coordination
KW - Payoff-irrelevant cues
KW - Cognition
U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2019.08.001
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2019.08.001
M3 - Journal article
VL - 117
SP - 461
EP - 478
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
SN - 0899-8256
ER -