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Helpless in finance: the cost of helping effort among bank employees

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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Helpless in finance: the cost of helping effort among bank employees. / Brown, Michelle; Heywood, John.
In: Journal of Labor Research, Vol. 30, No. 2, 06.2009, p. 176-195.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Brown, M & Heywood, J 2009, 'Helpless in finance: the cost of helping effort among bank employees', Journal of Labor Research, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 176-195. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12122-009-9063-8

APA

Brown, M., & Heywood, J. (2009). Helpless in finance: the cost of helping effort among bank employees. Journal of Labor Research, 30(2), 176-195. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12122-009-9063-8

Vancouver

Brown M, Heywood J. Helpless in finance: the cost of helping effort among bank employees. Journal of Labor Research. 2009 Jun;30(2):176-195. doi: 10.1007/s12122-009-9063-8

Author

Brown, Michelle ; Heywood, John. / Helpless in finance : the cost of helping effort among bank employees. In: Journal of Labor Research. 2009 ; Vol. 30, No. 2. pp. 176-195.

Bibtex

@article{df0812b777c1490dae888734c53db520,
title = "Helpless in finance: the cost of helping effort among bank employees",
abstract = "Theory suggests that individual performance pay increases effort but may reduce the incentive to help co-workers. In an original survey of finance industry employees subject to individual performance pay, we demonstrate that those workers who report they do not help co-workers earn significantly more. This result is particularly strong for those workers with the strongest individual performance pay incentives. Moreover, when those workers report that their coworkers help them, they also earn significantly more. These dual results are consistent with a strong incentive to free-ride on the helping effort of others in the face of individual performance pay.",
keywords = "Helping effort, Free-riding , Performance pay",
author = "Michelle Brown and John Heywood",
year = "2009",
month = jun,
doi = "10.1007/s12122-009-9063-8",
language = "English",
volume = "30",
pages = "176--195",
journal = "Journal of Labor Research",
issn = "0195-3613",
publisher = "Springer New York",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Helpless in finance

T2 - the cost of helping effort among bank employees

AU - Brown, Michelle

AU - Heywood, John

PY - 2009/6

Y1 - 2009/6

N2 - Theory suggests that individual performance pay increases effort but may reduce the incentive to help co-workers. In an original survey of finance industry employees subject to individual performance pay, we demonstrate that those workers who report they do not help co-workers earn significantly more. This result is particularly strong for those workers with the strongest individual performance pay incentives. Moreover, when those workers report that their coworkers help them, they also earn significantly more. These dual results are consistent with a strong incentive to free-ride on the helping effort of others in the face of individual performance pay.

AB - Theory suggests that individual performance pay increases effort but may reduce the incentive to help co-workers. In an original survey of finance industry employees subject to individual performance pay, we demonstrate that those workers who report they do not help co-workers earn significantly more. This result is particularly strong for those workers with the strongest individual performance pay incentives. Moreover, when those workers report that their coworkers help them, they also earn significantly more. These dual results are consistent with a strong incentive to free-ride on the helping effort of others in the face of individual performance pay.

KW - Helping effort

KW - Free-riding

KW - Performance pay

U2 - 10.1007/s12122-009-9063-8

DO - 10.1007/s12122-009-9063-8

M3 - Journal article

VL - 30

SP - 176

EP - 195

JO - Journal of Labor Research

JF - Journal of Labor Research

SN - 0195-3613

IS - 2

ER -