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How autism shows that symptoms, like psychiatric diagnoses, are 'constructed': methodological and epistemic consequences

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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How autism shows that symptoms, like psychiatric diagnoses, are 'constructed': methodological and epistemic consequences. / Fellowes, Sam.
In: Synthese, Vol. 199, No. 1-2, 31.12.2021, p. 4499-4522.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Fellowes, S 2021, 'How autism shows that symptoms, like psychiatric diagnoses, are 'constructed': methodological and epistemic consequences', Synthese, vol. 199, no. 1-2, pp. 4499-4522. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02988-3

APA

Fellowes, S. (2021). How autism shows that symptoms, like psychiatric diagnoses, are 'constructed': methodological and epistemic consequences. Synthese, 199(1-2), 4499-4522. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02988-3

Vancouver

Fellowes S. How autism shows that symptoms, like psychiatric diagnoses, are 'constructed': methodological and epistemic consequences. Synthese. 2021 Dec 31;199(1-2):4499-4522. Epub 2021 Jan 23. doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02988-3

Author

Fellowes, Sam. / How autism shows that symptoms, like psychiatric diagnoses, are 'constructed': methodological and epistemic consequences. In: Synthese. 2021 ; Vol. 199, No. 1-2. pp. 4499-4522.

Bibtex

@article{33dfe4fa200a42e584572107ffbfd821,
title = "How autism shows that symptoms, like psychiatric diagnoses, are 'constructed': methodological and epistemic consequences",
abstract = "Critics who are concerned over the epistemological status of psychiatric diagnoses often describe them as being constructed. In contrast, those critics usually see symptoms as relatively epistemologically unproblematic. In this paper I show that symptoms are also constructed. To do this I draw upon the demarcation between data and phenomena. I relate this distinction to psychiatry by portraying behaviour of individuals as data and symptoms as phenomena. I then draw upon philosophers who consider phenomena to be constructed to argue that symptoms are also constructed. Rather than being ready made in the world I show how symptoms are constructs we apply to the world. I highlight this with a historical example and describe methodological constraints on symptom construction. I show the epistemic problems with psychiatric diagnoses are also applicable to symptoms. Following this, I suggest that critics of psychiatric diagnoses should extend their criticism to symptoms or, if they still believe symptoms are relatively epistemologically unproblematic, should rethink their concerns over psychiatric diagnoses.",
keywords = "Psychiatric symptoms, Psychiatric diagnoses, Realism, Constructivism",
author = "Sam Fellowes",
year = "2021",
month = dec,
day = "31",
doi = "10.1007/s11229-020-02988-3",
language = "English",
volume = "199",
pages = "4499--4522",
journal = "Synthese",
issn = "0039-7857",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
number = "1-2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - How autism shows that symptoms, like psychiatric diagnoses, are 'constructed': methodological and epistemic consequences

AU - Fellowes, Sam

PY - 2021/12/31

Y1 - 2021/12/31

N2 - Critics who are concerned over the epistemological status of psychiatric diagnoses often describe them as being constructed. In contrast, those critics usually see symptoms as relatively epistemologically unproblematic. In this paper I show that symptoms are also constructed. To do this I draw upon the demarcation between data and phenomena. I relate this distinction to psychiatry by portraying behaviour of individuals as data and symptoms as phenomena. I then draw upon philosophers who consider phenomena to be constructed to argue that symptoms are also constructed. Rather than being ready made in the world I show how symptoms are constructs we apply to the world. I highlight this with a historical example and describe methodological constraints on symptom construction. I show the epistemic problems with psychiatric diagnoses are also applicable to symptoms. Following this, I suggest that critics of psychiatric diagnoses should extend their criticism to symptoms or, if they still believe symptoms are relatively epistemologically unproblematic, should rethink their concerns over psychiatric diagnoses.

AB - Critics who are concerned over the epistemological status of psychiatric diagnoses often describe them as being constructed. In contrast, those critics usually see symptoms as relatively epistemologically unproblematic. In this paper I show that symptoms are also constructed. To do this I draw upon the demarcation between data and phenomena. I relate this distinction to psychiatry by portraying behaviour of individuals as data and symptoms as phenomena. I then draw upon philosophers who consider phenomena to be constructed to argue that symptoms are also constructed. Rather than being ready made in the world I show how symptoms are constructs we apply to the world. I highlight this with a historical example and describe methodological constraints on symptom construction. I show the epistemic problems with psychiatric diagnoses are also applicable to symptoms. Following this, I suggest that critics of psychiatric diagnoses should extend their criticism to symptoms or, if they still believe symptoms are relatively epistemologically unproblematic, should rethink their concerns over psychiatric diagnoses.

KW - Psychiatric symptoms

KW - Psychiatric diagnoses

KW - Realism

KW - Constructivism

U2 - 10.1007/s11229-020-02988-3

DO - 10.1007/s11229-020-02988-3

M3 - Journal article

VL - 199

SP - 4499

EP - 4522

JO - Synthese

JF - Synthese

SN - 0039-7857

IS - 1-2

ER -