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How do licensing regimes limit worker interests?: Evidence from informal employment in Britain

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Published
  • Ian Clark
  • James Hunter
  • Richard Pickford
  • Huw Fearnall-Williams
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<mark>Journal publication date</mark>1/02/2022
<mark>Journal</mark>Economic and Industrial Democracy
Issue number1
Volume43
Number of pages19
Pages (from-to)431-449
Publication StatusPublished
<mark>Original language</mark>English

Abstract

Informalized workplaces are a growing presence in the UK: for example, hand car washes frequently house informalized low-wage, precarious workers who are paid less than the minimum wage and who experience other forms of labour market exploitation. These ‘new’ forms of work and the related informalization of work appear to challenge the embedded interplay between formal institutions and agency. This article advances three areas of discussion. Firstly, what enables informalized workplaces to remain apparently unregulated? Secondly, in contrast to other locations why is there is no collective hybrid form of representation and resistance at car washes in the UK? Thirdly, how do licensing schemes for car washes have the potential to marginalize worker interests?