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In what ways are designers' and operators' reasonable-world assumptions not reasonable assumptions?

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In what ways are designers' and operators' reasonable-world assumptions not reasonable assumptions? / Busby, J. S.; Chung, P. W. H.

In: Process Safety and Environmental Protection, Vol. 81, No. 2, 03.2003, p. 114-120.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

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Busby JS, Chung PWH. In what ways are designers' and operators' reasonable-world assumptions not reasonable assumptions? Process Safety and Environmental Protection. 2003 Mar;81(2):114-120. doi: 10.1205/095758203321832589

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Busby, J. S. ; Chung, P. W. H. / In what ways are designers' and operators' reasonable-world assumptions not reasonable assumptions?. In: Process Safety and Environmental Protection. 2003 ; Vol. 81, No. 2. pp. 114-120.

Bibtex

@article{871cead3eb2345beb96963a782fb8ffa,
title = "In what ways are designers' and operators' reasonable-world assumptions not reasonable assumptions?",
abstract = "Although the technical reliability of complex process plant generally continues to improve, such systems remain vulnerable to unmet assumptions on the part of designers, operators and maintenance staff. The purpose of this study was to characterize the nature of these assumptions, particularly those that were implied in people's activity rather than those that were explicitly invoked. Inferences about the assumptions were made from a set of accident reports. This characterization was then used as the basis of a tool that could help people examine how either their own or other peoples{\textquoteright} assumptions could imperil a system. Such a tool both structures the process of testing assumptions and helps synthesize the knowledge provided by historical failures. The tool was evaluated with a variety of organizations and used in a case study, where it contributed to the process of risk analysis in a variety of ways.",
keywords = "human factors, hazards, assumptions",
author = "Busby, {J. S.} and Chung, {P. W. H.}",
note = "Accepted 22/01/2003",
year = "2003",
month = mar,
doi = "10.1205/095758203321832589",
language = "English",
volume = "81",
pages = "114--120",
journal = "Process Safety and Environmental Protection",
issn = "0957-5820",
publisher = "Institution of Chemical Engineers",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - In what ways are designers' and operators' reasonable-world assumptions not reasonable assumptions?

AU - Busby, J. S.

AU - Chung, P. W. H.

N1 - Accepted 22/01/2003

PY - 2003/3

Y1 - 2003/3

N2 - Although the technical reliability of complex process plant generally continues to improve, such systems remain vulnerable to unmet assumptions on the part of designers, operators and maintenance staff. The purpose of this study was to characterize the nature of these assumptions, particularly those that were implied in people's activity rather than those that were explicitly invoked. Inferences about the assumptions were made from a set of accident reports. This characterization was then used as the basis of a tool that could help people examine how either their own or other peoples’ assumptions could imperil a system. Such a tool both structures the process of testing assumptions and helps synthesize the knowledge provided by historical failures. The tool was evaluated with a variety of organizations and used in a case study, where it contributed to the process of risk analysis in a variety of ways.

AB - Although the technical reliability of complex process plant generally continues to improve, such systems remain vulnerable to unmet assumptions on the part of designers, operators and maintenance staff. The purpose of this study was to characterize the nature of these assumptions, particularly those that were implied in people's activity rather than those that were explicitly invoked. Inferences about the assumptions were made from a set of accident reports. This characterization was then used as the basis of a tool that could help people examine how either their own or other peoples’ assumptions could imperil a system. Such a tool both structures the process of testing assumptions and helps synthesize the knowledge provided by historical failures. The tool was evaluated with a variety of organizations and used in a case study, where it contributed to the process of risk analysis in a variety of ways.

KW - human factors

KW - hazards

KW - assumptions

U2 - 10.1205/095758203321832589

DO - 10.1205/095758203321832589

M3 - Journal article

VL - 81

SP - 114

EP - 120

JO - Process Safety and Environmental Protection

JF - Process Safety and Environmental Protection

SN - 0957-5820

IS - 2

ER -