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Incentive reversal

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Incentive reversal. / Winter, E.
In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol. 1, No. 2, 08.2009, p. 133-147.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Winter, E 2009, 'Incentive reversal', American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 133-147. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.1.2.133

APA

Winter, E. (2009). Incentive reversal. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 1(2), 133-147. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.1.2.133

Vancouver

Winter E. Incentive reversal. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2009 Aug;1(2):133-147. doi: 10.1257/mic.1.2.133

Author

Winter, E. / Incentive reversal. In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2009 ; Vol. 1, No. 2. pp. 133-147.

Bibtex

@article{99fb1688c75a443eb28e2c8bf28e4816,
title = "Incentive reversal",
abstract = "By incentive reversal we refer to situations in which an increase in rewards for all agents results in fewer agents exerting effort. We show that externalities among peers may give rise to such intriguing situations even when all agents are fully rational. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the organizational technology so that it will be susceptible to incentive reversal. The condition implies that some degree of complementarity is enough to allow incentive reversal.",
author = "E. Winter",
year = "2009",
month = aug,
doi = "10.1257/mic.1.2.133",
language = "English",
volume = "1",
pages = "133--147",
journal = "American Economic Journal: Microeconomics",
issn = "1945-7669",
publisher = "American Economic Association",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Incentive reversal

AU - Winter, E.

PY - 2009/8

Y1 - 2009/8

N2 - By incentive reversal we refer to situations in which an increase in rewards for all agents results in fewer agents exerting effort. We show that externalities among peers may give rise to such intriguing situations even when all agents are fully rational. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the organizational technology so that it will be susceptible to incentive reversal. The condition implies that some degree of complementarity is enough to allow incentive reversal.

AB - By incentive reversal we refer to situations in which an increase in rewards for all agents results in fewer agents exerting effort. We show that externalities among peers may give rise to such intriguing situations even when all agents are fully rational. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the organizational technology so that it will be susceptible to incentive reversal. The condition implies that some degree of complementarity is enough to allow incentive reversal.

U2 - 10.1257/mic.1.2.133

DO - 10.1257/mic.1.2.133

M3 - Journal article

VL - 1

SP - 133

EP - 147

JO - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

JF - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

SN - 1945-7669

IS - 2

ER -