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Inequality, institutions and cooperation

Research output: Working paper

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Inequality, institutions and cooperation. / Markussen, Thomas; Sharma, Smriti ; Singhal, Saurabh et al.
Lancaster: Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 2020. (Economics Working Papers Series).

Research output: Working paper

Harvard

Markussen, T, Sharma, S, Singhal, S & Tarp, F 2020 'Inequality, institutions and cooperation' Economics Working Papers Series, Lancaster University, Department of Economics, Lancaster.

APA

Markussen, T., Sharma, S., Singhal, S., & Tarp, F. (2020). Inequality, institutions and cooperation. (Economics Working Papers Series). Lancaster University, Department of Economics.

Vancouver

Markussen T, Sharma S, Singhal S, Tarp F. Inequality, institutions and cooperation. Lancaster: Lancaster University, Department of Economics. 2020 Nov 2. (Economics Working Papers Series).

Author

Markussen, Thomas ; Sharma, Smriti ; Singhal, Saurabh et al. / Inequality, institutions and cooperation. Lancaster : Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 2020. (Economics Working Papers Series).

Bibtex

@techreport{0bdf1b202c124a9cbbc34f7e4c76080d,
title = "Inequality, institutions and cooperation",
abstract = "We examine the effects of randomly introduced economic inequality on voluntary co-operation and whether this relationship is influenced by the quality of local institutions, as proxied by corruption. We use representative data from a large-scale lab-in-the-field public goods experiment with over 1,300 participants across rural Vietnam. Our results show that inequality adversely affects aggregate contributions, and this is on account of high endowment individuals contributing a significantly smaller share than those with low endowments. This negative effect of inequality on cooperation is exacerbated in high corruption environments. We nd that corruption leads to more pessimistic beliefs about others' contributions in heterogeneous groups, and this is an important mechanism explaining our results. In doing so, we highlight the indirect costs of corruption that are understudied in the literature. These findings have implications for public policies aimed at resolving local collective action problems.",
keywords = "Inequality, institutions, corruption, public goods, lab-in- field experiment",
author = "Thomas Markussen and Smriti Sharma and Saurabh Singhal and Finn Tarp",
year = "2020",
month = nov,
day = "2",
language = "English",
series = "Economics Working Papers Series",
publisher = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Inequality, institutions and cooperation

AU - Markussen, Thomas

AU - Sharma, Smriti

AU - Singhal, Saurabh

AU - Tarp, Finn

PY - 2020/11/2

Y1 - 2020/11/2

N2 - We examine the effects of randomly introduced economic inequality on voluntary co-operation and whether this relationship is influenced by the quality of local institutions, as proxied by corruption. We use representative data from a large-scale lab-in-the-field public goods experiment with over 1,300 participants across rural Vietnam. Our results show that inequality adversely affects aggregate contributions, and this is on account of high endowment individuals contributing a significantly smaller share than those with low endowments. This negative effect of inequality on cooperation is exacerbated in high corruption environments. We nd that corruption leads to more pessimistic beliefs about others' contributions in heterogeneous groups, and this is an important mechanism explaining our results. In doing so, we highlight the indirect costs of corruption that are understudied in the literature. These findings have implications for public policies aimed at resolving local collective action problems.

AB - We examine the effects of randomly introduced economic inequality on voluntary co-operation and whether this relationship is influenced by the quality of local institutions, as proxied by corruption. We use representative data from a large-scale lab-in-the-field public goods experiment with over 1,300 participants across rural Vietnam. Our results show that inequality adversely affects aggregate contributions, and this is on account of high endowment individuals contributing a significantly smaller share than those with low endowments. This negative effect of inequality on cooperation is exacerbated in high corruption environments. We nd that corruption leads to more pessimistic beliefs about others' contributions in heterogeneous groups, and this is an important mechanism explaining our results. In doing so, we highlight the indirect costs of corruption that are understudied in the literature. These findings have implications for public policies aimed at resolving local collective action problems.

KW - Inequality

KW - institutions

KW - corruption

KW - public goods

KW - lab-in-field experiment

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Economics Working Papers Series

BT - Inequality, institutions and cooperation

PB - Lancaster University, Department of Economics

CY - Lancaster

ER -