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Information sharing, information free-riding and capital structure in oligopolies

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Information sharing, information free-riding and capital structure in oligopolies. / Dasgupta, Sudipto; Shin, Jhinyoung.
In: International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 17, No. 1, 01.01.1999, p. 109-135.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Dasgupta, S & Shin, J 1999, 'Information sharing, information free-riding and capital structure in oligopolies', International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 109-135. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-7187(97)00022-2

APA

Vancouver

Dasgupta S, Shin J. Information sharing, information free-riding and capital structure in oligopolies. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 1999 Jan 1;17(1):109-135. Epub 1998 Oct 21. doi: 10.1016/S0167-7187(97)00022-2

Author

Dasgupta, Sudipto ; Shin, Jhinyoung. / Information sharing, information free-riding and capital structure in oligopolies. In: International Journal of Industrial Organization. 1999 ; Vol. 17, No. 1. pp. 109-135.

Bibtex

@article{6ad6c2fb5f944005af7206d78ebe8b27,
title = "Information sharing, information free-riding and capital structure in oligopolies",
abstract = "We study the effect of capital structure decisions on the incentives for firms in a duopoly to share information through a trade association. Focusing on the case of Cournot competition with demand uncertainty, we find that the standard result for all-equity firms that information will not be shared may be reversed. When one firm has better access to information than the other, leverage may be a way for the latter firm to free-ride on the former firm's information. With ex ante symmetric firms, a trade association will be formed even if information sharing does not occur.",
author = "Sudipto Dasgupta and Jhinyoung Shin",
year = "1999",
month = jan,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/S0167-7187(97)00022-2",
language = "English",
volume = "17",
pages = "109--135",
journal = "International Journal of Industrial Organization",
issn = "0167-7187",
publisher = "Elsevier Inc.",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Information sharing, information free-riding and capital structure in oligopolies

AU - Dasgupta, Sudipto

AU - Shin, Jhinyoung

PY - 1999/1/1

Y1 - 1999/1/1

N2 - We study the effect of capital structure decisions on the incentives for firms in a duopoly to share information through a trade association. Focusing on the case of Cournot competition with demand uncertainty, we find that the standard result for all-equity firms that information will not be shared may be reversed. When one firm has better access to information than the other, leverage may be a way for the latter firm to free-ride on the former firm's information. With ex ante symmetric firms, a trade association will be formed even if information sharing does not occur.

AB - We study the effect of capital structure decisions on the incentives for firms in a duopoly to share information through a trade association. Focusing on the case of Cournot competition with demand uncertainty, we find that the standard result for all-equity firms that information will not be shared may be reversed. When one firm has better access to information than the other, leverage may be a way for the latter firm to free-ride on the former firm's information. With ex ante symmetric firms, a trade association will be formed even if information sharing does not occur.

U2 - 10.1016/S0167-7187(97)00022-2

DO - 10.1016/S0167-7187(97)00022-2

M3 - Journal article

VL - 17

SP - 109

EP - 135

JO - International Journal of Industrial Organization

JF - International Journal of Industrial Organization

SN - 0167-7187

IS - 1

ER -