TY - JOUR

T1 - Intrafamilial conflict and parental investment : a synthesis.

AU - Parker, Geoff A.

AU - Royle, Nick J.

AU - Hartley, Ian R.

PY - 2002/3/29

Y1 - 2002/3/29

N2 - We outline and develop current theory on how inherent genetic conflicts of interest between the various family members can affect the flow of parental investment from parents to offspring, and discuss the problems for empirical testing that this generates. The parental investment pattern realized in nature reflects the simultaneous resolution of all the conflicts between the family players. This depends on the genetic mechanism, the mating system and reproductive constraints, on whether extra demand by progeny affects current or future sibs, and particularly on the behavioural mechanisms underlying demand (begging or solicitation) and supply (provision of parental investment by parents). The direction of deviation from the optimal parental investment for the parent(s) depends on the slope of what we term the 'effect of supply on demand', the mechanism that determines how changes in food supply affect begging levels. If increasing food increases begging (positive slope), less parental investment is supplied than the parental optimum and if increasing food decreases begging (negative slope), more parental investment is supplied. The magnitude of deviation depends on both the 'effect of supply on demand' and on the 'effect of demand on supply' (the mechanism determining how changes in begging affect food supply, which always has a positive slope). We conclude that it will often be impossible to deduce the extent of underlying conflict by establishing the amount of parental investment given relative to the ideal optimum for the parent. Some possible directions for future research are discussed.

AB - We outline and develop current theory on how inherent genetic conflicts of interest between the various family members can affect the flow of parental investment from parents to offspring, and discuss the problems for empirical testing that this generates. The parental investment pattern realized in nature reflects the simultaneous resolution of all the conflicts between the family players. This depends on the genetic mechanism, the mating system and reproductive constraints, on whether extra demand by progeny affects current or future sibs, and particularly on the behavioural mechanisms underlying demand (begging or solicitation) and supply (provision of parental investment by parents). The direction of deviation from the optimal parental investment for the parent(s) depends on the slope of what we term the 'effect of supply on demand', the mechanism that determines how changes in food supply affect begging levels. If increasing food increases begging (positive slope), less parental investment is supplied than the parental optimum and if increasing food decreases begging (negative slope), more parental investment is supplied. The magnitude of deviation depends on both the 'effect of supply on demand' and on the 'effect of demand on supply' (the mechanism determining how changes in begging affect food supply, which always has a positive slope). We conclude that it will often be impossible to deduce the extent of underlying conflict by establishing the amount of parental investment given relative to the ideal optimum for the parent. Some possible directions for future research are discussed.

KW - Evolutionarily Stable Strategy Begging Behaviour Parent-Offspring Conflict Parental Investment Sib Competition

U2 - 10.1098/rstb.2001.0950

DO - 10.1098/rstb.2001.0950

M3 - Journal article

VL - 357

SP - 295

EP - 307

JO - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences

JF - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences

SN - 0962-8436

IS - 1419

ER -