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Intuitions are never used as evidence in ethics

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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Intuitions are never used as evidence in ethics. / Herok, Tomasz.
In: Synthese, Vol. 201, No. 2, 42, 24.01.2023.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Herok, T 2023, 'Intuitions are never used as evidence in ethics', Synthese, vol. 201, no. 2, 42. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-04031-z

APA

Herok, T. (2023). Intuitions are never used as evidence in ethics. Synthese, 201(2), Article 42. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-04031-z

Vancouver

Herok T. Intuitions are never used as evidence in ethics. Synthese. 2023 Jan 24;201(2):42. doi: 10.1007/s11229-022-04031-z

Author

Herok, Tomasz. / Intuitions are never used as evidence in ethics. In: Synthese. 2023 ; Vol. 201, No. 2.

Bibtex

@article{8a330898fd1f4eb399ec5d21777b082a,
title = "Intuitions are never used as evidence in ethics",
abstract = "One can often hear that intuitions are standardly “appealed to”, “relied on”, “accounted for”, or “used as evidence” in ethics. How should we interpret these claims? I argue that the typical understanding is what Bernard Molyneux calls “descriptive evidentialism”: the idea that intuition-states are treated as evidence of their propositional contents in the context of justification. I then argue that descriptive evidentialism is false–on any account of what intuitions are. That said, I admit that ethicists frequently rely on intuitions to clarify, persuade, discover, or to support things other than the intuitions{\textquoteright} contents. The contents of intuitions are also commonly used as starting premises of philosophical arguments. However claims about these practices need to be sharply distinguished from the prevalent dogma.",
keywords = "Original Research, Evidence in Law and Ethics, Intuitions, Evidence, Metaphilosophy, Philosophical methodology, Reflective equilibrium, Method of cases",
author = "Tomasz Herok",
year = "2023",
month = jan,
day = "24",
doi = "10.1007/s11229-022-04031-z",
language = "English",
volume = "201",
journal = "Synthese",
issn = "0039-7857",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Intuitions are never used as evidence in ethics

AU - Herok, Tomasz

PY - 2023/1/24

Y1 - 2023/1/24

N2 - One can often hear that intuitions are standardly “appealed to”, “relied on”, “accounted for”, or “used as evidence” in ethics. How should we interpret these claims? I argue that the typical understanding is what Bernard Molyneux calls “descriptive evidentialism”: the idea that intuition-states are treated as evidence of their propositional contents in the context of justification. I then argue that descriptive evidentialism is false–on any account of what intuitions are. That said, I admit that ethicists frequently rely on intuitions to clarify, persuade, discover, or to support things other than the intuitions’ contents. The contents of intuitions are also commonly used as starting premises of philosophical arguments. However claims about these practices need to be sharply distinguished from the prevalent dogma.

AB - One can often hear that intuitions are standardly “appealed to”, “relied on”, “accounted for”, or “used as evidence” in ethics. How should we interpret these claims? I argue that the typical understanding is what Bernard Molyneux calls “descriptive evidentialism”: the idea that intuition-states are treated as evidence of their propositional contents in the context of justification. I then argue that descriptive evidentialism is false–on any account of what intuitions are. That said, I admit that ethicists frequently rely on intuitions to clarify, persuade, discover, or to support things other than the intuitions’ contents. The contents of intuitions are also commonly used as starting premises of philosophical arguments. However claims about these practices need to be sharply distinguished from the prevalent dogma.

KW - Original Research

KW - Evidence in Law and Ethics

KW - Intuitions

KW - Evidence

KW - Metaphilosophy

KW - Philosophical methodology

KW - Reflective equilibrium

KW - Method of cases

U2 - 10.1007/s11229-022-04031-z

DO - 10.1007/s11229-022-04031-z

M3 - Journal article

VL - 201

JO - Synthese

JF - Synthese

SN - 0039-7857

IS - 2

M1 - 42

ER -