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Is training more frequent when the wage premium is smaller?: evidence from the European Community household panel

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Is training more frequent when the wage premium is smaller? evidence from the European Community household panel. / Bassanini, Andrea; Brunello, Giorgio.
In: Labour Economics, Vol. 15, No. 2, 04.2008, p. 272-290.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Bassanini, A & Brunello, G 2008, 'Is training more frequent when the wage premium is smaller? evidence from the European Community household panel', Labour Economics, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 272-290. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2007.01.002

APA

Bassanini, A., & Brunello, G. (2008). Is training more frequent when the wage premium is smaller? evidence from the European Community household panel. Labour Economics, 15(2), 272-290. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2007.01.002

Vancouver

Bassanini A, Brunello G. Is training more frequent when the wage premium is smaller? evidence from the European Community household panel. Labour Economics. 2008 Apr;15(2):272-290. doi: 10.1016/j.labeco.2007.01.002

Author

Bassanini, Andrea ; Brunello, Giorgio. / Is training more frequent when the wage premium is smaller? evidence from the European Community household panel. In: Labour Economics. 2008 ; Vol. 15, No. 2. pp. 272-290.

Bibtex

@article{19399ad551a544ffb0ad441d338201e0,
title = "Is training more frequent when the wage premium is smaller?: evidence from the European Community household panel",
abstract = "According to Becker [Becker, G., 1964, Human Capital, NBER, New York], when labour markets are perfectly competitive, general training is paid by the worker, who reaps all the benefits from the investment. Therefore, ceteris paribus, the greater the training wage premium, the greater the investment in general training. Using data from the European Community Household Panel, we compute a proxy of the training wage premium in clusters of homogeneous workers and find that smaller premia induce greater incidence of off-site training, which is likely to impart general skills. Our findings suggest that the Becker model provides insufficient guidance to understand empirical training patterns. Conversely, they are not inconsistent with theories of training in imperfectly competitive labour markets, in which firms may be willing to finance general training if the wage structure is compressed, that is, if the increase in productivity after training is greater than the increase in pay.",
author = "Andrea Bassanini and Giorgio Brunello",
year = "2008",
month = apr,
doi = "10.1016/j.labeco.2007.01.002",
language = "English",
volume = "15",
pages = "272--290",
journal = "Labour Economics",
issn = "0927-5371",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Is training more frequent when the wage premium is smaller?

T2 - evidence from the European Community household panel

AU - Bassanini, Andrea

AU - Brunello, Giorgio

PY - 2008/4

Y1 - 2008/4

N2 - According to Becker [Becker, G., 1964, Human Capital, NBER, New York], when labour markets are perfectly competitive, general training is paid by the worker, who reaps all the benefits from the investment. Therefore, ceteris paribus, the greater the training wage premium, the greater the investment in general training. Using data from the European Community Household Panel, we compute a proxy of the training wage premium in clusters of homogeneous workers and find that smaller premia induce greater incidence of off-site training, which is likely to impart general skills. Our findings suggest that the Becker model provides insufficient guidance to understand empirical training patterns. Conversely, they are not inconsistent with theories of training in imperfectly competitive labour markets, in which firms may be willing to finance general training if the wage structure is compressed, that is, if the increase in productivity after training is greater than the increase in pay.

AB - According to Becker [Becker, G., 1964, Human Capital, NBER, New York], when labour markets are perfectly competitive, general training is paid by the worker, who reaps all the benefits from the investment. Therefore, ceteris paribus, the greater the training wage premium, the greater the investment in general training. Using data from the European Community Household Panel, we compute a proxy of the training wage premium in clusters of homogeneous workers and find that smaller premia induce greater incidence of off-site training, which is likely to impart general skills. Our findings suggest that the Becker model provides insufficient guidance to understand empirical training patterns. Conversely, they are not inconsistent with theories of training in imperfectly competitive labour markets, in which firms may be willing to finance general training if the wage structure is compressed, that is, if the increase in productivity after training is greater than the increase in pay.

U2 - 10.1016/j.labeco.2007.01.002

DO - 10.1016/j.labeco.2007.01.002

M3 - Journal article

VL - 15

SP - 272

EP - 290

JO - Labour Economics

JF - Labour Economics

SN - 0927-5371

IS - 2

ER -