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It's a jungle out there: International trade when bargaining power matters

Research output: Working paper

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It's a jungle out there: International trade when bargaining power matters. / Soo, Kwok Tong.
Lancaster: Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 2017. (Economics Working Papers Series).

Research output: Working paper

Harvard

Soo, KT 2017 'It's a jungle out there: International trade when bargaining power matters' Economics Working Papers Series, Lancaster University, Department of Economics, Lancaster.

APA

Soo, K. T. (2017). It's a jungle out there: International trade when bargaining power matters. (Economics Working Papers Series). Lancaster University, Department of Economics.

Vancouver

Soo KT. It's a jungle out there: International trade when bargaining power matters. Lancaster: Lancaster University, Department of Economics. 2017 Sept. (Economics Working Papers Series).

Author

Soo, Kwok Tong. / It's a jungle out there: International trade when bargaining power matters. Lancaster : Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 2017. (Economics Working Papers Series).

Bibtex

@techreport{ae9737d9cb6f4659b73eff2cecb634a1,
title = "It's a jungle out there: International trade when bargaining power matters",
abstract = "Anti-globalisation protesters often claim that the gains from trade accrue primarily to large countries. This contradicts conventional trade models, which predict that small countries gain more from trade than do large countries. We first present evidence which shows that the terms of trade do indeed move in favour of countries which become larger. We then develop a model of international trade based on Ricardian comparative advantage, in which the terms of trade are derived based on the bargaining power of the two trading partners. If bargaining power depends on country size, the terms of trade will be in the larger country{\textquoteright}s favour. However, general equilibrium adjustments mean that the larger country may not be better off under Nash bargaining than under free trade. The smaller country is unambiguously worse off compared to free trade.",
keywords = "Nash bargaining, gains from trade, Ricardian model",
author = "Soo, {Kwok Tong}",
year = "2017",
month = sep,
language = "English",
series = "Economics Working Papers Series",
publisher = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - It's a jungle out there: International trade when bargaining power matters

AU - Soo, Kwok Tong

PY - 2017/9

Y1 - 2017/9

N2 - Anti-globalisation protesters often claim that the gains from trade accrue primarily to large countries. This contradicts conventional trade models, which predict that small countries gain more from trade than do large countries. We first present evidence which shows that the terms of trade do indeed move in favour of countries which become larger. We then develop a model of international trade based on Ricardian comparative advantage, in which the terms of trade are derived based on the bargaining power of the two trading partners. If bargaining power depends on country size, the terms of trade will be in the larger country’s favour. However, general equilibrium adjustments mean that the larger country may not be better off under Nash bargaining than under free trade. The smaller country is unambiguously worse off compared to free trade.

AB - Anti-globalisation protesters often claim that the gains from trade accrue primarily to large countries. This contradicts conventional trade models, which predict that small countries gain more from trade than do large countries. We first present evidence which shows that the terms of trade do indeed move in favour of countries which become larger. We then develop a model of international trade based on Ricardian comparative advantage, in which the terms of trade are derived based on the bargaining power of the two trading partners. If bargaining power depends on country size, the terms of trade will be in the larger country’s favour. However, general equilibrium adjustments mean that the larger country may not be better off under Nash bargaining than under free trade. The smaller country is unambiguously worse off compared to free trade.

KW - Nash bargaining

KW - gains from trade

KW - Ricardian model

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Economics Working Papers Series

BT - It's a jungle out there: International trade when bargaining power matters

PB - Lancaster University, Department of Economics

CY - Lancaster

ER -