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Leading and merging: convex costs, Stackelberg and the merger paradox

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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Leading and merging: convex costs, Stackelberg and the merger paradox. / Heywood, John; Mcginty, Matthew.
In: Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 74, No. 3, 01.2008, p. 879-893.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Heywood, J & Mcginty, M 2008, 'Leading and merging: convex costs, Stackelberg and the merger paradox', Southern Economic Journal, vol. 74, no. 3, pp. 879-893. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20112001>

APA

Heywood, J., & Mcginty, M. (2008). Leading and merging: convex costs, Stackelberg and the merger paradox. Southern Economic Journal, 74(3), 879-893. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20112001

Vancouver

Heywood J, Mcginty M. Leading and merging: convex costs, Stackelberg and the merger paradox. Southern Economic Journal. 2008 Jan;74(3):879-893.

Author

Heywood, John ; Mcginty, Matthew. / Leading and merging : convex costs, Stackelberg and the merger paradox. In: Southern Economic Journal. 2008 ; Vol. 74, No. 3. pp. 879-893.

Bibtex

@article{4ba5a52457d34d0db9e616652c9523a4,
title = "Leading and merging: convex costs, Stackelberg and the merger paradox",
abstract = "This paper examines the consequences of a Stackelberg leader merging with followers when costs are convex. Such mergers are always profitable for the participants, and the followers often do better merging than remaining excluded rivals. This resolution of the merger paradox cannot be generated either by Stackelberg leadership without convex costs or by convex costs without leadership. In addition, with convex costs, a merger with the leader can actually harm excluded rivals (suggesting why they might object to the merger) and increase social welfare.",
author = "John Heywood and Matthew Mcginty",
year = "2008",
month = jan,
language = "English",
volume = "74",
pages = "879--893",
journal = "Southern Economic Journal",
issn = "0038-4038",
publisher = "Southern Economic Association",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Leading and merging

T2 - convex costs, Stackelberg and the merger paradox

AU - Heywood, John

AU - Mcginty, Matthew

PY - 2008/1

Y1 - 2008/1

N2 - This paper examines the consequences of a Stackelberg leader merging with followers when costs are convex. Such mergers are always profitable for the participants, and the followers often do better merging than remaining excluded rivals. This resolution of the merger paradox cannot be generated either by Stackelberg leadership without convex costs or by convex costs without leadership. In addition, with convex costs, a merger with the leader can actually harm excluded rivals (suggesting why they might object to the merger) and increase social welfare.

AB - This paper examines the consequences of a Stackelberg leader merging with followers when costs are convex. Such mergers are always profitable for the participants, and the followers often do better merging than remaining excluded rivals. This resolution of the merger paradox cannot be generated either by Stackelberg leadership without convex costs or by convex costs without leadership. In addition, with convex costs, a merger with the leader can actually harm excluded rivals (suggesting why they might object to the merger) and increase social welfare.

M3 - Journal article

VL - 74

SP - 879

EP - 893

JO - Southern Economic Journal

JF - Southern Economic Journal

SN - 0038-4038

IS - 3

ER -