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Managing procurement auctions

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Managing procurement auctions. / Dasgupta, Sudipto; Pulber, Daniel F.

In: Information Economics and Policy, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1990, p. 5-29.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Dasgupta, S & Pulber, DF 1990, 'Managing procurement auctions', Information Economics and Policy, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 5-29. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-6245(89)90030-9

APA

Dasgupta, S., & Pulber, D. F. (1990). Managing procurement auctions. Information Economics and Policy, 4(1), 5-29. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-6245(89)90030-9

Vancouver

Dasgupta S, Pulber DF. Managing procurement auctions. Information Economics and Policy. 1990;4(1):5-29. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-6245(89)90030-9

Author

Dasgupta, Sudipto ; Pulber, Daniel F. / Managing procurement auctions. In: Information Economics and Policy. 1990 ; Vol. 4, No. 1. pp. 5-29.

Bibtex

@article{ff1a3e0ecada420a936dd537cfd79c8a,
title = "Managing procurement auctions",
abstract = "Three mechanisms are considered that extend the standard fixed quantity auction: (I) sole sourcing with output chosen in advance by a buyer with downward-sloping demand; (II) sole sourcing with an output schedule based on revelation of cost parameters; and (III) multiple sourcing with output allocation across suppliers based on revelation of cost parameters. Procedures are characterized for the sole sourcing and multiple sourcing problems that implement the buyer's optimal mechanism.",
author = "Sudipto Dasgupta and Pulber, {Daniel F.}",
year = "1990",
doi = "10.1016/0167-6245(89)90030-9",
language = "English",
volume = "4",
pages = "5--29",
journal = "Information Economics and Policy",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Managing procurement auctions

AU - Dasgupta, Sudipto

AU - Pulber, Daniel F.

PY - 1990

Y1 - 1990

N2 - Three mechanisms are considered that extend the standard fixed quantity auction: (I) sole sourcing with output chosen in advance by a buyer with downward-sloping demand; (II) sole sourcing with an output schedule based on revelation of cost parameters; and (III) multiple sourcing with output allocation across suppliers based on revelation of cost parameters. Procedures are characterized for the sole sourcing and multiple sourcing problems that implement the buyer's optimal mechanism.

AB - Three mechanisms are considered that extend the standard fixed quantity auction: (I) sole sourcing with output chosen in advance by a buyer with downward-sloping demand; (II) sole sourcing with an output schedule based on revelation of cost parameters; and (III) multiple sourcing with output allocation across suppliers based on revelation of cost parameters. Procedures are characterized for the sole sourcing and multiple sourcing problems that implement the buyer's optimal mechanism.

U2 - 10.1016/0167-6245(89)90030-9

DO - 10.1016/0167-6245(89)90030-9

M3 - Journal article

VL - 4

SP - 5

EP - 29

JO - Information Economics and Policy

JF - Information Economics and Policy

IS - 1

ER -