TY - JOUR

T1 - Market-Based Lobbying

T2 - Evidence from Advertising Spending in Italy

AU - DellaVigna, Stefano

AU - Durante, Ruben

AU - Knight, Brian

AU - La Ferrara, Eliana

PY - 2016/1/31

Y1 - 2016/1/31

N2 - We analyze a novel lobbying channel: firms shifting spending toward a politician's business in the hope of securing favorable regulation. We examine the evolution of advertising spending in Italy during 1993-2009, a period in which Berlusconi was in power three separate times, while maintaining control of Italy's major private television network, Mediaset. We document a significant pro-Mediaset bias in the allocation of advertising during Berlusconi's political tenure, especially for companies in more regulated sectors. We estimate that Mediaset profits increased by one billion euros during this period and that regulated firms anticipated sizeable returns, stressing the economic importance of this channel.

AB - We analyze a novel lobbying channel: firms shifting spending toward a politician's business in the hope of securing favorable regulation. We examine the evolution of advertising spending in Italy during 1993-2009, a period in which Berlusconi was in power three separate times, while maintaining control of Italy's major private television network, Mediaset. We document a significant pro-Mediaset bias in the allocation of advertising during Berlusconi's political tenure, especially for companies in more regulated sectors. We estimate that Mediaset profits increased by one billion euros during this period and that regulated firms anticipated sizeable returns, stressing the economic importance of this channel.

U2 - 10.1257/app.20150042

DO - 10.1257/app.20150042

M3 - Journal article

VL - 8

SP - 224

EP - 256

JO - American Economic Journal: Applied Economics

JF - American Economic Journal: Applied Economics

SN - 1945-7782

IS - 1

ER -