Matching auction with winner’s curse and imperfect financial markets

Economics

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Matching auction with winner’s curse and imperfect financial markets. / Matros, Alexander.
In: Economics Letters, Vol. 115, No. 3, 06.2012, p. 500-503.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Matros, A 2012, 'Matching auction with winner’s curse and imperfect financial markets', Economics Letters, vol. 115, no. 3, pp. 500-503. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.128

APA

Matros, A. (2012). Matching auction with winner’s curse and imperfect financial markets. Economics Letters, 115(3), 500-503. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.128

Vancouver

Matros A. Matching auction with winner’s curse and imperfect financial markets. Economics Letters. 2012 Jun;115(3):500-503. doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.128

Author

Matros, Alexander. / Matching auction with winner’s curse and imperfect financial markets. In: Economics Letters. 2012 ; Vol. 115, No. 3. pp. 500-503.

Bibtex

@article{736d36d1945b4468a99dc774d74b2cf2,

title = "Matching auction with winner{\textquoteright}s curse and imperfect financial markets",

abstract = "This paper explains how and why the Matching Auctions work better with Imperfect Financial Markets. We show that an efficient outsider can obtain a “good” project even if the insider has informational advantage.",

keywords = "Asymmetric information, Adverse selection , Winner{\textquoteright}s curse , Takeover game",

author = "Alexander Matros",

year = "2012",

month = jun,

doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.128",

language = "English",

volume = "115",

pages = "500--503",

journal = "Economics Letters",

issn = "0165-1765",

publisher = "Elsevier",

number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Matching auction with winner’s curse and imperfect financial markets

AU - Matros, Alexander

PY - 2012/6

Y1 - 2012/6

N2 - This paper explains how and why the Matching Auctions work better with Imperfect Financial Markets. We show that an efficient outsider can obtain a “good” project even if the insider has informational advantage.

AB - This paper explains how and why the Matching Auctions work better with Imperfect Financial Markets. We show that an efficient outsider can obtain a “good” project even if the insider has informational advantage.

KW - Asymmetric information

KW - Adverse selection

KW - Winner’s curse

KW - Takeover game

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.128

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.128

M3 - Journal article

VL - 115

SP - 500

EP - 503

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

SN - 0165-1765

IS - 3

ER -

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